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The Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute is one of the
major works in criminal law. It has had a remarkable impact since its
completion in 1962. More than half of the states have expressly relied
on the Code,' numerous other states have been influenced by it in their
recent codifications, and innumerable court decisions have discussed the
provisions of the Code. 2 One of the difficulties with the Code stemmed
from the fact that the original Commentaries to it were completed in
1962. 3 In the two decades since the Code came out there have been
tremendous changes in the substantive criminal law which were not reflected in the earlier commentaries to the Code. Many states have substantially limited the application of the felony-murder rule.4 With
respect to the death penalty, the United States Supreme Court has been
extremely active, holding that the "sentence of death is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual
punishment," 5 and further holding that death penalty statutes are only
constitutional if they "guide, regularize, and make rationally reviewable
the process for imposing a sentence of death. ' 6 In other areas as well,
the changes have been dramatic. Some states have begun to consider
7
the possibility, at least, of convicting a husband for the rape of his wife,
* © 1982 by Paul Marcus. The excellent research assistance of Helen Gunn, University
of Illinois College of Law, Class of 1983 is gratefully acknowledged.
1 According to the revised commentaries, 34 "state codifications or revisions have now
drawn upon the Model." MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES XI (Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1980) [hereinafter cited as COMMENTARIES].
2 The Code was also quite influential in the drafting of the proposed revised Federal
Criminal Code, currently pending in Congress as H.R. 4711 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
3 Thirteen tentative drafts with accompanying comments were considered between 1953
and 1962.
4 See inja text accompanying notes 73-97.
5 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
6 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976).
7 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 163.375 (1979) which provides: "(1) A person who has sex-
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and in most jurisdictions the problem of criminal actions revolving
around child custody disputes has intensified. 8
Professor Peter Low as Reporter and Professor John Jeffries as Associate Reporter, both from the University of Virginia School of Law,
have provided a great service by revising and updating these commentaries. Their work began in 1976 and took almost five years; this tremendous effort is reflected in a fine product spanning three volumes.
In this article I will analyze the Code, along with the Commentaries, as found in the first of these volumes, "Offenses Involving Danger to
the Person." 9 Four separate topics are dealt with in this volume: Criminal Homicide (Article 210); Assault, Reckless Endangering, Threats (Article 211); Kidnapping and Related Offenses, Coercion (Article 212);
and Sexual Offenses (Article 213). I will focus attention on the first of
these topics.
This review is restricted to an evaluation of the homicide materials
solely because of time and space constraints. Such a restriction is unfortunate, as important issues continue to arise in the other three areas and
are well analyzed by the commentators. In the death penalty area
much discussion is given to the questions of the role of the jury in imposing the penalty, the type of homicide which should be the subject of the
penalty, and the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. 10 The
materials dealing with rape focus attention on the proof problems, the
question of the desirability of gender neutral language in a rape statute,11 and grading of statutes which impose certain age limitations for
ual intercourse with a female commits the crime of rape in the first degree if: (a) The female
is subjected to forcible compulsion by the male."
8 Section 212.4 of the Code provides, in part, that an offense is committed if the defendant "knowlingly or recklessly takes or entices any child under the age of 18 from the custody
of its parent, guardian or other lawful custodian when he has no privilege to do so." See
discussion in COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 249-52, 257-61.
9 The other two volumes deal with offenses against property (arson, burglary, robbery,
theft, forgery), offenses against the family (bigamy, incest) and offenses against public administration (bribery, perjury, obstructing governmental operations, abuse of office) or against
public order and decency (riot, disorderly conduct, obscenity).
10 See discussion in COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 110-71.
11 The commentators discuss this point:
There are a number of features of the Michigan statute that should be noted in
contrast to the Model Code. Perhaps the most striking is the avoidance of gender specificity in the Michigan statute and the grading consequences of such an approach. Rape
by a female upon a male or another female and rape by a male upon another male are
treated in Michigan at the same level of seriousness as rape by a male upon a female.
There is symbolic importance in the introduction of such an equivalence into the law.
There are also cases where the trauma of rape may be just as great as in the male imposition upon a female to which the most serious form of the offense has been traditionally
confined. But the fact remains, as reflected in the Model Penal Code, that rape is perceived as such a serious crime because of the frequency of attacks by males upon females
and because of the peculiar harms generally associated with that form of the offense.
Undoubtedly the serious sanctions of the Michigan statute are designed with that case in

1982]

BOOK REVIEWS

sexual relations with an underage victim.' 2 Finally, in the assault area
the Code "undertakes a substantial restructing of prior law. It eliminates the common law categories and many of the antecedent statutory
3
variations in favor of a single integrated provision."'
It is in the homicide area, however, that the Model Penal Code has
had perhaps the greatest impact. In bringing uniformity to an inconsistent body of law, in taking positions on controversial substantive areas,14
and in developing a grading system which brings important policy considerations into the forefront of the punishment decisions, the Code's
contribution is significant. It is to this contribution that we now turn.
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE

The draftsmen of the Code chose to deal with a host of subjects
under the rubric of "criminal homicide." Analysis of responsibility for
aiding the suicide attempts of another, a view of the capital punishment
quandry, and a discussion of negligent homicide are but a few of the
areas discussed. In this portion of the article, I will explore in some
detail three subjects of particular importance: the definitions of criminal homicide, murder, and manslaughter.
The Model Penal Code, section 210.1, provides that:
"(1) A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he purposely,
knowingly, recklessly or negligently causes the death of another human
being.
(2) Criminal homicide is murder, manslaughter or negligent
homicide."
There are three striking features of the homicide definition.' 5 The
first is not apparent from a reading of § 210.1, but rather is one emphasized by the commentators. The Code simply requires that the actor
cause the death of the victim.' 6 It thus "renders unnecessary the ancient
requirement that death of another take place within a year and a day of
mind and will in fact be imposed in such cases in all but a very few instances. Nevertheless, as an abstract proposition, the question of whether a rape statute should be drafted
in sex neutral terms seems a close one. . . . [I]t may well be that the Michigan approach
is the more desirable.
Id. at 294.
12 The rape materials are discussed id. at 274-356.
13 Id. at 183.
14 Controversial substantive areas of the law which the Model Penal Code has taken a
position on are the grading of murder into degrees and the felony murder rule.
15 As might be expected, however, there are other features that are important as well, such
as the limitation of homicide to actions which the defendant causes purposely, knowingly,
recklessly, or negligently; and the division of criminal homicide into but three categories of
murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide.
16 COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 9.
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the actor's conduct,"' 7 the so-called year-and-a-day rule.
By the Eighteenth Century, and indeed much earlier, we find a general
assumption that a homicide could be prosecuted as such only if the death
occurred within a year and a day of the act; this was distinct from any
question of the period of limitations for commencing a prosecution ...
The standard, if perhaps unhistorical, explanation of the rule, often repeated in the books, is that in the condition of medical science until recent
times, it would have been hard to establish convincingly a line of causation
between an act and a relatively distant death, and it was thus plausible to
make the presumption ('conclusive' as well as arbitrary) that a death more
than a year removed from the assault or similar antecedent arose from a
natural rather than the criminal cause. .

.

. Occasionally it has been

surmised that the rule was linked in some way to the early function of the
jury as reporters of the happenings of the vicinage who required no aid
from witnesses-but the jury would not have had knowledge sufficient to
trace cause to effect over a sizeable interval of time. .

.

. Again we find a

suggestion that the rule
was intended simply to soften the old brutal law
8
regarding homicides.'
The rule has been subject to considerable criticism and has been rejected by many legislators and courts.' 9 As one New Jersey court put it:
The court recognize[s] advances in medical technology to which the law
must respond.
The acceptance or rejection of available medical technology and machines which can postpone the actual time of death, due whenever it occurs, as a result of wounds inflicted upon a victim, should not insulate the
assailant from trial and punishment for the crime.
The common law "year and a day rule" does not conform to presentday medical realities, principles of equity or public policy. We reject it as
an anachronism
and declare that it is no longer part of the common law of
20
this State.
The second striking feature of the homicide definition is that the
Code does not define the crucial term "death." This omission is, in a
sense, justifiable because most states do not define the term in their penal codes and "because this delicate interplay between the criminal law
and the advances of medial science is yet too uncertain to reduce to
statutory formulation. ' 2 1 Such an approach by the draftsmen is too
facile. In many states today efforts are being made to codify the definition of the term; in still others, judges have had to wrestle with different
and conflicting definitions.
The commentators correctly note that in the vast majority of homiId.
18 Commonwealth v. Lewis, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1973, 409 N.E.2d 771, 772-73 (1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 929 (1981).
19 But see, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-4008 (1979); Commonwealth v. Ladd, 402 Pa. 164, 178,
17

166 A.2d 501, 512 (1960) (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
20 State v. Young, 148 N.J. Super. 405, 412-13, 372 A.2d 1117, 1121 (1977).
21 COMMENTARIES,

supra note 1, at 11.
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cide cases the meaning of death is not at issue. 22 In these cases, no matter what the definition, the victim is clearly dead. In other cases, where
the victim's condition is maintained through sophisticated medical technology, the question is a troublesome one.23 The issue was well stated
by an English law professor, Ian Kennedy:
What is this discussion of death all about? Until comparatively recently,
there was no argument about when someone was dead. Death was defined
as "the absence of vital functions", breathing and heart beat. Then along
came machines which could maintain a patient's breathing. Polio victims
were among the beneficiaries of this development, since the so-called iron
lung could now breathe for them. Then there appeared machines which
could take over the functions of the heart and lungs for a while. Open
heart surgery, in which the heart may be stopped for a period of time,
became possible.
But inevitably a problem arose. If we regard someone as dead when
his vital functions are absent, what do we do with someone whose vital
functions are maintained by a machine and accompanying technology?
The polio victim isn't dead, nor is the patient undergoing heart surgery.
But the victim of a car accident whose head has been crushed is breathing
by means of a respirator though the respirator may be ventilating 2a4 corpse.
Clearly the machinery may mimic life when the patient is dead.
In this country the issue has begun to surface with some regularity,
as in the case of State v. Fierro.25 The defendant there purposefully shot
Victor Corella in the head. Corella was taken to the hospital where
emergency surgery was performed. He was maintained on support systems for three days; at that point the systems were terminated and he
was pronounced dead. The court conceded that under the common law
test (which had been used up to that point in Arizona) he would not
have been legally dead, for "the body of the victim was breathing,
though not spontaneously, and blood was pulsating through his body
before the life support mechanisms were withdrawn. '26 Under the more
modern view of death, Corella had died three days before the systems
were withdrawn, because at that time his brain was no longer able to
function. The Uniform Brain Death Act 2 7 stated that "for legal and
medical purposes an individual who has sustained irreversible cessation
22 Id.

at 10.

The best known case raising the problem was the Karen Quinlan case, In re Quinlan, 70
N.J. 10, 57, 355 A.2d 647, 669, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976), where the court concluded
that there was no "reasonable possibility of return to cognitive and sapient life, as distinguished from the forced continuance of that biological vegetative existence to which Karen
seems to be doomed."
24 Kennedy, Show Biz and the Doctors-Why Panorama Was Wrong, The Sunday Times
(London), Nov. 30, 1980, § 1, at 16, col. 3.
25 124 Ariz. 182, 603 P.2d 74 (1979).
26 Id. at 185, 603 P.2d at 77.
27 UNIFORM BRAIN DEATH AcT (1980).
23
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of all functioning of the brain including the brain stem, is dead." The
28
Harvard Medical School test, discussed by the Code commentators,
defines "cessation of life" as "brain death" which occurs when there is
"(1) unresponsiveness to normally painful stimuli; (2) absence of spontaneous movements or breathing; and (3) absence of reflexes."
The court adopted the modern view and concluded that the victim
had suffered brain death before the supports had been withdrawn,
hence the defendant could properly be convicted of a homicide offense.2 9 No doubt, the victim was dead before the support systems were
withdrawn, and the defendant was the one who killed him. Without
any statutory guidelines as to the definition of death, however, all parties were acting under a severe handicap in predicting the result in the
case, surely raising some due process concerns. It is just this sort of case
which the Model Penal Code could and should reach. The failure to
define the crucial term, "death," is unfortunate, though perhaps not fatal. The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, established by Congress in 1978, has just recommended that the states endorse the concept
that human life ends when the brain stops functioning. 30 The recommendation is receiving a good deal of attention and is likely to have a
major impact in the near future on the law in this area. Still, it is both
disappointing and surprising that the draftsmen of the Model Penal
3
Code chose not to develop their own definition of this term. 1
It is, finally, worth noting that under the homicide definition,
"human being" is a person "who has been born and is alive." Such a
definition maintains the earliest common law view that homicide offenses are only committed when the victim is born alive:
If a woman be quick with childe, and by a potion or otherwise killeth it in
her wombe, or if a man beat her, whereby the childe dyeth in her body,
and she is delivered of a dead childe, this is a great misprision [i.e., misdemeanor], and no murder; but if the childe be born alive and dyeth of the
is accounted a
potion, battery, or other cause, this is murder; for in law it
32
reasonable creature, in rerum natura, when it is born alive.
One of the obvious reasons for so limiting the definition was to avoid
supra note 1, at 10.
29 124 Ariz. at 185, 603 P.2d at 77.
30 The full statute is as follows:
28 COMMENTARIES,

An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory function, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including
the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must be made in accordance with
accepted medical standards.
31 This is particularly surprising in light of the approach taken by the Code in the murder
and manslaughter sections. The draftsmen there were meticulous in their phraseology and
attempted to specify the elements of the offenses. See infra text accompanying notes 45-138.
32 3 E. COKE, INSTITUTES 58 (1648).
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dealing with the abortion question in the homicide area. "Although
there may remain a role for the penal law in the field of abortion, there
is at least a continuing necessity to avoid enmeshing this quite distinct
problem in the law of homicide. ' 33 On this point the draftsmen and
commentators are certainly correct. The legal issues surrounding abortion are complex and diverse, but they are distinct from those normally
involved with the law of criminal homicide. It is preferable to deal with
34
such issues apart from the homicide area.
In one area, though, the limited definition of human being raises
some question, as recognized by the commentators. "Whatever one's
evaluation of [abortion], it seems useful to distinguish abortion from the
intentional killing of a fetus without the mother's consent. As a matter
of policy, it may be thought appropriate to punish such conduct as
35
murder."
Keeler v. Superior Court3 6 demonstrates this point very well. The defendant's former wife became pregnant by another man. One day, on
an isolated mountain road the defendant encountered her, saw that she
was pregnant and "pushed her against the car, shoved his knee into her
abdomen, and struck her in the face with several blows."'3 7 There was
little question that the defendant intended to do severe harm to both the
mother and the fetus.3 8 The head of the fetus was found to be severely
fractured, and it was delivered stillborn. The defendant was convicted
under a statute which defined murder as "the unlawful killing of a
human being, with malice aforethought. '39 The dissenting justices argued that the conviction was proper, for the question "whether a homicide occurred. . . would be determined by medical testimony regarding
the capability of the child to have survived prior to the defendant's
act."40 The majority of the California supreme court disagreed, finding
that under the usual murder statute the legislature could not have intended to cover the defendant's actions.4 1 If it had so intended, the stat33 COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 12.
34 The abortion issues are dealt with in
35 COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 12.

§ 230.3 of the Code.

36 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970).
37 Id. at 623, 470 P.2d at 618, 87 Cal. Rptr.. at 482.
38 After noticing that his former wife was pregnant, the defendant exclaimed, "I'm going
to stomp it out of you." Id.
39 CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1970).
40 2 Cal. 3d at 641, 470 P.2d at 632, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 496 (Burke, C.J., dissenting). The
medical testimony was clear that the fetus had an excellent chance of survival, but for the

defendant's actions. "'Baby Girl' Vogt, . ..had reached the 35th week of development,
[and] had a 96 percent chance of survival

....

"

2 Cal. 3d at 639-40, 470 P.2d at 630, 87

Cal. Rptr. at 494 (Burke, C.J., dissenting).
41 It is the policy of this state to construe a penal statute as favorably to the defendants
as its language and the circumstances of its application may reasonably permit; just as in
the case of a question of fact, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable
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ute "would deny him due process of law." '42
One could certainly draft a statute which does not deal with the
abortion situation, but does make into a homicide offense the beating of
a woman which results in the child being delivered stillborn. 43 What is
perplexing about the commentators' view of such a statute is that they
and the draftsmen have simply chosen not to deal with the sensitive
question. Many judges and legislators have grappled with the issue of
whether such a killing constitutes a homicide offense; 44 it is regrettable
that the Code does not offer guidance in this difficult area.
MURDER

The Model Penal Code, section 210.2, provides that
(1) Except as provided in Section 210.3(1)(b),14 51 criminal homicide
constitutes murder when:
(a)
it is committed purposely or knowingly; or
(b)
it is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Such recklessness and
indifference are presumed if the actor is engaged or is an accomplice in
the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing
or attempting to commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual intercourse by
force or threat of force, arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious escape.

It is in the definition of murder that the Model Penal Code has
made its greatest contribution. In an area fraught with confusion and
contradiction, the draftsmen and commentators have sought to bring
clarity and uniformity. On the whole, they have succeeded. At comdoubt as to the true interpretation of words or the construction of language used in a
statute ....
We hold that in adopting the definition of murder in Penal Code section
187 the Legislature intended to exclude from its reach the act of killing an unborn fetus
The first essential of due process is fair warning of the act which is made punishable
as a crime. "That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently
explicit to inform those who are subject to what conduct on their part will render them
liable to its penalties, is a well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary
notions of fair play and the settled rules of law" ....
"No one may be required at peril
of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids."...
This requirement of fair warning is reflected in the constitutional prohibition
against the enactment of ex post facto laws. . . . When a new penal statute is applied
retrospectively to make punishable an act which was not criminal at the time it was
performed, the defendant has been given no advance notice consistent with due process.
And precisely the same effect occurs when such an act is made punishable under a preexisting statute but by means of an unforeseeablejudical enlargement thereof.
Id. at 631, 633-34, 470 P.2d at 624, 626, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 488, 490.
42 Id. at 639, 470 P.2d at 630, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 494.
43 Illinois and California have both passed statutes which preclude application of the
homicide statute in cases where abortion was legally authorized. See CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 187(b) (West Supp. 1981); ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, § 9-1.1 (1981) (specifically referring to
the new homicide offense of "feticide.").
44 See COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 11-12.
45 This is the manslaugher section. See injfra text accompanying notes 98-138.
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mon law, murder was the unlawful killing of another human being with
"malice aforethought." The term "malice aforethought," often clipped
to malice, has no specific definition suitable for use in the area of homicide. 46 Instead, it is thought that killings in four situations evidence a
sufficiently criminal mind as to constitute murder. First, of course, malice includes an intent to kill.4 7 Second, malice means an intent to inflict

grievous bodily harm. Third, the term includes the state of mind present under the genteel terminology of "depraved heart" or "abandoned
and malignant heart." This category covers those cases in which the defendant acted with extreme recklessness. The fourth situation, and the
most difficult for this writer,48 consists of killings committed during the
course of certain other crimes, felony murder. This clarity of categorization in the malice aforethought area may be more apparent than real,
for states were hardly consistent in the application of the doctrine, while
49
still others sought to embellish the term by statutory definition.
The confusion in this area was further compounded by the adoption of statutes dividing murder into degrees, a position first taken by
the state of Pennsylvania in 1794. "The thrust of this reform was to
confine the death penalty, which was then mandatory on conviction of
'50
any common-law murder, to homicides judged particularly heinous.
The murder was deemed sufficiently horrible if the killing had been
"perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other
kind of willful, deliberate or premeditated killing."' 5 1 While one might
argue whether or not these standards were appropriate, it at least appeared clear what was meant by the statutory terminology. Unfortunately, the phrase "willful, deliberate or premeditated killing" in
practice was not at all clear.
The leading discussion of the definition of the terms under first degree murder statutes is probably Judge Leventhal's opinion in Austin v.
UnitedStates.52 There the defendant had brutally stabbed the victim to
46 Unlike, for instance, the definition of malice in the defamation area which refers to
knowledge of the falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. See New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
47 The intent to kill will normally be murder unless committed in the heat of passion
under the manslaughter statutes. See in/a text accompanying notes 103-127.
48 See infra discussion at text accompanying notes 73-97.
49 The commentators refer to the Georgia code sections, since repealed, which defined the
term as "that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature, which
is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof" or implied malice "where no considerable provocation appears and where all the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart." COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 17.
50 Id. at 16.
51 This reference excludes the felony murder provisions which were present in the statutes
which otherwise divided murder into degrees.
52 382 F.2d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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death, inflicting dozens of knife wounds all over her body. The defendant was convicted of first degree murder after the trial judge had instructed the jury that the deliberation and premeditation under the first
degree murder statute could be "in the nature of hours, minutes, or
seconds."' 53 Judge Leventhal began by exploring the rationale for the
first degree murder statute:
Statutes like ours, which distinguish deliberate and premeditated murder
from other murder, reflect a belief that one who meditates an intent to kill
and then deliberately executes it is more dangerous, more culpable or less
capable of reformation than one who kills on sudden impulse; or that the
prospect of the death penalty is more likely to deter men from deliberate
than from impulsive murder. The 5deliberate
killer is guilty of first degree
4
murder; the impulsive killer is not.
What the legislature had in mind was "that the determination to kill
was reached calmly and in cold blood rather than under impulse or the
heat of passion and was reached some appreciable time prior to the
homicide." 55 Thus, the trial judge's instruction to the jury was erroneous; by referring to the premeditation element as one which could be
committed in a matter of seconds, he had essentially converted virtually
all murders into first degree murders, an intent the legislature could not
56
have had.
Austin illustrates well the problems which the degree statutes created. The Model Penal Code approach rejects the degrees principle and
instead provides a clear and healthy balance between the requirements
of particular states of mind, and severe punishment for particular types
53 The court stated to the jury:

It is your duty to determine from all of the facts and the circumstances which have been
presented to you in this case that you may find surrounding the killing on April
24 . . . whether there was any reflection and consideration amounting to deliberation
by the defendant ....
Now if there was such deliberation, even though it be of an
exceedingly brief duration, that is in itself, so far as the deliberation is concerned, is
sufficient. Because it is the fact of deliberation rather than the length of time it required
that is important. Although some time, that is there must be some time to deliberate in
the mind of the defendant Austin the premeditation and the deliberation. As I have told
you before, the time itself may be in the nature of hours, minutes, or seconds. But there
must be the deliberation and the premeditation.
Id. at 133, n.1.
54 Id. at 134 (quoting Bullock v. United States, 122 F.2d 213, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1941)).
55 Id at 134.
56 The court stated:
In homespun terminology, intentional murder is in the first degree if committed in
cold blood, and is murder in the second degree if committed on impulse or in the sudden
heat of passion. These are the archtypes, that clarify by contrast. The real facts may be
hard to classify and may lie between the poles. A sudden passion, like lust, rage, or
jealousy, may spawn an impulsive intent yet persist long enough and in such a way as to
permit that intent to become the subject of a further reflection and weighing of consequences and hence to take on the character of a murder executed without compunction
and "in cold blood."
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of killings. 57 As indicated earlier, under the traditional view of malice,
murder was committed by a killing accompanied by an intent to kill, an
intent to inflict great bodily harm, or a "depraved heart."' 58 In the abstract, the terms-at least the first two-may be straightforward. In
practice, however, the terms were difficult to apply in the cases in which
the actor probably knew that he would cause death or great bodily
harm, but there was some question as to whether that result was his goal
or his purpose. For instance, did the husband intend to kill his wife when
he ordered her into the river and she drowned? 59 Did the "stepmother"
intend to kill her six year old girl when she "whipped" the child continuously?60 Similarly, did the defendant itend to inflict grave bodily harm
on his wife when he struck her and she bumped her head on the car?6 1
In these cases the defendants certainly knew of the likely consequences
of their acts, but some doubt must be raised as to whether they intended
such consequences.
The Model Penal Code avoids this fine distinction between intent
and knowledge by allowing for a murder conviction if the killing was
done in a purposeful or knowing fashion. The commentators properly
remark that for homicide purposes there ought not to be any distinction
between an intentional killing and a knowing killing. The Code thus
rejects those statutes which so distinguish, either with regard to the definitions of the offenses or the grading of them for purposes of punishment. 62 The commentators also make clear the nature of proof required
for intent, purpose or knowledge. That is, under the Code the judge
may not instruct the jury to presume that the defendant intended
the natural or probable consequences of his acts. Liability under Section
210.2(1) (a) may not rest merely on a finding that the defendant purposefully or knowingly did something which had death of another as its natural
and probable consequence. Rather, the prosecution must establish that
the defendant engaged in conduct with the conscious objective of causing
that death of another was pracdeath of another or at least with awareness
63
tically certain to result from his act.
This conclusion is quite proper; murder is the highest homicide offense
precisely because the defendant's culpability is the greatest. A murder
57 Id. at 137. The punishment provisions of the Code are not treated in this article. A
person convicted of murder, however, may be sentenced to death under certain circumstances
pursuant to § 210.6.
58 Or by a killing during the course of the commission of a felony. See infra text accompanying notes 73-97.
59 Yes, he knew she could not swim. State v. Myers, 7 N.J. 465, 81 A.2d 710 (1951).
60 Yes. State v. Lamborn, 452 S.W.2d 216 (Mo. 1970).
61 Yes, he should have immediately taken his wife to the hospital. People v. Geiger, 10
Mich. App. 348, 159 N.W.2d 383 (1968).
62 E.g., Wisc. STAT. §§ 940.01-.03 (1979). See COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 20.
63 Id. at 20-21.
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charge should not stand upon so tenuous a ground as what somebody
else knew, or what a natural consequence should have been. Of course,
direct evidence of intent or knowledge is not required, and the jury may
be told that it can infer the necessary state of mind from the acts of the
defendant. That, however, is quite different-and far more justifiablethan an instruction as to presumptions of natural and probable
consequences.
Suppose the defendant does not intend to inflict grievous bodily
harm, does not intend to kill, and does not know that the death will
occur. Should the defendant be convicted of murder under other circumstances? Even today, few people would contest the murder conviction of the defendant who shoots a gun into a room,64 shoots it into a
moving automobile, 65 or takes a small child and literally throws her into
her bedroom. 66 When death occurs the actor is seen as greatly at fault,
even though he may not have intended that death would result, or may
not have known that the victim would die. He is held for murder because he consciously disregarded a grave risk to a fellow human being.
In common law terms, he has evidenced an "abandoned and malignant
heart." The Code follows this rationale, but seeks to clarify the meaning
of the rule. The defendant can be held for murder when the act is
"committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life." Though the language is still a bit
hazy, it is a vast improvement over the common law terminology 67 and
it achieves its "primary purpose of communicating to jurors in ordinary
68
language the task expected of them."1
Two points should be made concerning the extreme indifference
formulation. First, it is not indifference to any risk which will give rise to
a murder charge in this context. It is a risk which demonstrates the
defendant's total disregard for human life; it is the shooting of the gun,
the brutal treatment of the young child. Any action short of this "extreme indifference" can still be considered as a homicidal act, but only
at the level of manslaughter rather than murder. 69 Second, it should be
People v. Jernatowski, 238 N.Y. 188, 144 N.E. 497 (1924).
Hill v. Commonweath, 239 Ky. 646, 40 S.W.2d 261 (1931).
Seidler v. State, 64 Wisc. 2d 456, 219 N.W.2d 320 (1974).
The language in the Code is certainly an improvement over other academic efforts in
the area. One law professor has defined murder to include unintentional homicide "by an act
so extremely dangerous and disregardful of the lives and safety of others as to be wantonly
disregardful of such interests according to the standard of the conduct of a reasonable man
under the circumstances." Moreland, A SuggestedHomicide Statutefor Kentucky, 41 Ky. L.J. 139,
146 (1953). Another has summarized the common law version of unintentional murder as
involving "wanton and willful disregard of an unreasonable human risk." R. PERKINS,
CRIMINAL LAw 36-37, 46 (2d ed. 1969).
68 COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 25.
69 Section 210.3 defines manslaughter as an act which is "committed recklessly."
64
65
66
67
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stressed that the murder charge can only be sustained on a showing of
conscious disregard of the risk of harm to others. It is not enough to
prove that the defendant should have been aware of the probable consequences, or that other people knew or would have known of the consequences. The murder charge requires a very high degree of culpability:
the actual awareness of this very great risk. The famous English case of
Regina v. Ward,70 therefore, would not be valid under the Code, as noted
by the commentators. The defendant was a man of "sub-normal" intelligence who was charged with the murder of a small child. He testified
that he had picked up the crying child and shook her until she had
stopped. He had no intention to harm her seriously and apparently did
not understand that he was harming her. The thrust of his defense was
rejected by the trial judge who instructed the jury that
if, when he did the act which he did do, he must as a reasonable man have
contemplated that death or grievous bodily harm was likely to result to the
of the jury, if you are
child as a result of what he did, then, members
71
satisfied about that, he is guilty of murder.
Under the Code, this instruction is erroneous due to the reference to the
72
reliance on the standard of conduct of a "reasonable man."
The commentators state several times that under the Code a defendant can only be convicted of murder if he or she killed purposely,
knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. The felony murder rule as such is not
found in the Code. Still, the rule may have been adopted sub silento by
the draftsmen in the form of the following presumption: "Such recklessness and indifference are presumed if the actor is engaged or is an accomplice in the commission of,or an attempt to commit, or flight after
committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape, or deviate sexual
intercourse . . .arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious escape."

To

determine if the rule finds new life in the Code we must first examine
the traditional felony murder doctrine.
At common law, all defendants committing a felony were held for
murder if the killing occurred during the course of that felony.
Problems arose in the application of the rule. There have been cases in
70

[1956] 1 Q.B. 351.

71 Id. at 354-55.
72 As the commentators

point out, Parliament overruled Wdrd in the Criminal Justice Act
of 1967, ch. 80, § 8:
A court or jury, in determining whether a person has committed an offense,(a) shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of his
actions by reason only of its being a natural and probable consequence of those
actions; but
(b) shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to all the
evidence, drawing such inferences from the evidence as appear proper in the
circumstances.
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which the issue was whether a "killing" had occurred if the victim of the
crime dropped dead from a heart attack. 73 In other cases the defense
contended that the felony murder rule did not apply unless the killing
was in furtherance of the felony. 74 In numerous cases the defendants
asserted that the killing was not during the course of the crime because
the death occurred during the escape portion of the criminal endeavor. 75
Still, in virtually every American jurisdiction 76 the rule was a well established alternative to the other forms of malice aforethought for purposes
of proving murder.
The purpose of the felony murder rule has never been entirely
clear. Chief Justice Traynor stated that it was "to deter felons from
killing negligently or accidentally by holding them strictly responsible
for killings they commit. ' 77 At a time when all felonies were punishable
by death "it made little difference whether the actor was convicted of
murder or of the underlying felony because the sanction was the
same." 78 A broad based felony murder rule is indefensible in the modern world, where all kinds of acts which are not particularly dangerous
to life and are not given severe penalties are designated felonies. 79 As
the commentators properly remark, under the rule, the "homicide, as
73 People v. Stamp, 2 Cal. App. 3d 203, 82 Cal. Rptr. 598, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1969)
("So long as life is shortened as a result of the felonious act, it does not matter that the victim
might have died soon anyway. In this respect, the robber takes his victim as he finds him.").
74 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Waters, 491 Pa. 85, 92, 418 A.2d 312, 316 (1980) (it was
"error for the trial judge to refuse to instruct the jury that the state was required to show the
conduct causing the death was done in furtherance of the design to commit the felony.").
75 See, e.g., Whitman v. People, 161 Colo. 110, 420 P.2d 416 (1966) (felony murder rule
applied to killings which occurred during the escape from the commission of an offense).
76 Until the last decade, only Ohio had abandoned the felony murder rule. As pointed
out by the commentators, however, vestiges of the rule remain even in Ohio.
A close relative of the felony-murder rule is continued, however, under the label of imputed intent. A person who joins with another in a crime of violence is presumed to have
agreed to whatever acts may be necessary to accomplish the criminal objective. Thus,
each participant in an armed robbery may be presumed to have had a purpose to kill in
connection with an unplanned but foreseeable homicide committed incident to the
robbery.
COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 33 n.80.

77 People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777, 781, 402 P.2d 130, 133, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 445
(1965).
78 COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 31 n.74, states:

The primary use of the felony murder rule at common law therefore was to deal with a
homicide that occurred in furtherance of an attempted felony that failed. Since attempts
were punished as misdemeanors, . . . the use of the felony murder rule allowed the
courts to punish the actor in the same manner as if his"attempt had succeeded. Thus, a
conviction for attempted robbery was a misdemeanor, but a homicide committed in the
attempt was murder and punishable by death.
79 In Illinois, for instance, the following offenses are classified as felonies in the criminal
code. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 28-1.1 (1981) (syndicated gambling); § 29-1, 29-2 (offering or
accepting a bribe); § 31-4 (obstructing justice); § 32-3 (subornation of perjury); § 32-8 (tampering with public records); § 21-1 (criminal damage to property); and § 17-3 (forgery).
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distinct from the underlying felony, was thus an offense of strict liability."80 It is difficult, indeed, to justify a murder conviction under such a
strict liability rationale. As a practical matter, there has been no evidence to demonstrate that the felony murder rule serves a useful purpose
81
in actually deterring felons from killing negligently or accidentally.
More substantively, "it remains indefensible in principle to use the sanctions that the law employs to deal with murder unless there is at least a
finding that the actor's conduct manifested an extreme indifference to
82
the value of human life."
State legislators and judges have recognized the validity of the criticism in the Commentaries and have stepped back from the formerly
broad view of the felony murder rule. As the commentators discuss, the
rule has been limited in a number of significant ways, whether by statute or court decision.- In some states only particularly dangerous felonies
are covered under the rule.8 3 In other states, the felony must be one

which is independent of the homicide itself. Hence, assault with a
deadly weapon could not be the base felony under the rule because the
assault is an offense included in the charge of homicide. 84 In some jurisdictions the punishment has been downgraded.8 5 Still other states have
flatly rejected the felony murder rule.8 6 Foremost of these jurisdictions
is the state of Michigan which declared its position in the case of People v.
Aaron .87 The state supreme court first looked to "the most basic principle of the criminal law in general . . . criminal liability for causing a
supra note 1, at 31.
81 Indeed, the evidence is somewhat to the contrary. "There is no basis in experience for
thinking that homicides which the evidence makes accidental occur with disproportionate frequency in connection with specified felonies." COMMENTARIES, Mfira note 1, at 38 (emphasis
in original). The statistical evidence cited by the commentators shows that the number of all
homicides which occur during the course of robbery, burglary, and rape is somewhat lower
than might otherwise be expected. Id. at 38 n.96.
82 Id. at 38-39.
83 A number of codes specify the felonies which can be the basis for the rule. See, e.g., ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1 (1979). Some courts have attempted to limit the felony murder rule
to the felonies which, in the abstract, are inherently dangerous to human life. For criticism of
the rule, see COMMENTARIES, supira note 1, at 35.
84 For a dissenting view, see State v. Thompson, 88 Wash. 3d 13, 558 P.2d 202, appeal
dismissed, 434 U.S. 898 (1977).
85 Alaska, Louisiana, New York, Pennsylvania, and Utah have reduced the felony murder
crime to second degree murder. See discussion in People v. Aaron, infra, 409 Mich. 672, 689,
299 N.W.2d 304, 315 (1980).
86 Even in those states which have not acted in such drastic fashion, severe restrictions
have been imposed with respect to the foreseeability of the offense, especially with regard to
killings not directly caused by the defendant or a co-defendant. See, e.g., State v. Williams,
254 So. 2d 548 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Jackson v. State, 92 N.M. 461, 589 P.2d 1052
(1979). Contra, People v. Hickman, 59 Ill.2d 89, 319 N.E.2d 511 (1974); Jackson v. State, 286
Md. 430, 408 A.2d 711 (1979).
87 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980).
80 COMMENTARIES,
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particular result is not justified in the absence of some culpable mental
state in respect to that result."8 8 The court had little difficulty in concluding that
[t]he most fundamental characteristic of the felony-murder rule violates
this basic principle in that it punishes all homicides, committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of proscribed felonies whether intentional, unintentional or accidental, without the necessity of proving the
relation between the homicide and the perpetrator's state of mind. This is
most evident when a killing is done by one of a group of co-felons. The
felony-murder rule completely ignores the concept of determination of
guilt on the basis of individual misconduct. The felony-murder rule thus
"erodes the relation between criminal liability and moral culpability."8 9
The court then speculated that the impact of the abolition of the felony
murder rule would be limited:
From a practical standpoint, the abolition of the category of malice arising
from the intent to commit the underlying felony should have little effect on
the result of the majority of cases. In many cases where felony murder has
been applied, the use of the doctrine was unnecessary because the other
types of malice could have been inferred from the evidence.
Abrogation of this rule does not make irrelevant the fact that a death
occurred in the course of a felony. A jury can properly infer malice from
evidence that a defendant intentionally set in motion a force likely to cause
death or great bodily harm. . . . Thus, whenever a killing occurs in the
perpetration or attempted perpetration of an inherently dangerous felony,
• . .in order to establish malice the jury may consider the "nature of the
underlying felony and the circumstances surrounding its commission."
If the jury concludes that malice existed, they can find murder ...
As previously noted, in many circumstances the commission of a felony, particularly one involving violence or the use of force, will indicate an
intention to kill, an intention to cause great bodily harm, or wanton or
willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of defendant's
behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm. Thus, the felony-murder
rule is not necessary to establish mens rea in these cases.9
While few courts or legislatures have gone as far as the Aaron
court,9 ' it is beyond dispute that the modern trend is for severe limitation of the traditional felony murder rule. One would, therefore, hope
for and expect repudiation of the rule in the Model Penal Code and its
Commentaries. The rule is expressly repudicated, but the essense of it
seems to survive. The Code "creates a presumption of the required reck88 Id. at 708, 299 N.W.2d at 316.
89 Id., 299 N.W.2d at 317.
90 Id. at 729-30, 299 N.W.2d at 327. See also COMMENTARiES,=-pra note 1, at 37 ("For the
vast majority of cases it is probably true that homicide occurring during the commission or
attempted commission of a felony is murder independent of the felony-murder rule.').
91 In addition to Ohio, the states of Kentucky and Hawaii have specifically abolished the
felony murder doctrine. See discussion in People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. at 690, 299 N.W.2d at
314.
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lessness and extreme indifference, however, if a homicide occurs during
the commission or attempted commission of robbery, sexual attack, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or felonious escape."' 92 This presumption
also applies to the person who is an accomplice to the commission of one
of the specified crimes. The important question is whether this presumption differs in material form from the felony murder.
The Model Penal Code's approach is different from the traditional
rule in that the jurors are said to be free to disregard the "presumption."9 3 Thus, the commentators conclude that the effect of the Code
provision "is to abandon felony murder as a separate basis for establishing liability for homicide. '94 Two responses must be made to this conclusion. First, there is considerable doubt whether the jurors will
disregard the presumption, especially in cases in which no independent
evidence is offered as to the recklessness state of mind. That is, as I read
the presumption, the jurors may find (indeed, are encouraged to find)
the necessary state of mind with no evidence other than the commission
of the named felonies. This looks suspiciously like the felony murder
rule. Second, and more fundamentally, what possible basis can exist for
the presumption here? The commentators refer to the presumption "as
a concession to the facilitation of proof."'95 If, however, the felony murder rule is wrong because it fails to require "a finding that the actor's
conduct manifested an extreme indifference to the value of human
life,"' 96 it would seem that the presumption is just as wrong. A finding of
extreme indifference is required, but that requirement can be met
merely by a showing that the defendant or a co-defendant committed a
particular felony. The draftsmen and commentators remark that
"[p]rincipled argument in favor of the felony-murder doctrine is hard to
find,"' 97 yet it is also hard to find a principled argument in favor of the
presumption in the Code.
MANSLAUGHTER

The Model Penal Code, section 210.3, provides that
92 COMMENTARIES, sufura note 1, at 29.

93 Id. at 30. It is doubtful that the commentators mean to continue using the term "presumption" in this context. It appears more likely that they intend to use the term "inference"
which would allow the jury to reject the evidence with no contrary showing. If they truly
mean presumption in the sense that the burden of proving this element (recklessness) is on the
defendant, serious constitutional questions would have to be raised in light of Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) and Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). See generally
Underwood, The Thumb on the Seales ofJustice: Burdens of Persuasionin Ciminal Cases, 86 YALE
LJ. 1299 (1977). See also infra note 124.
94 COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 30,
95 Id.
96 Id. at 39.
97 Id. at 37.

BOOK REVIEWS

[Vol. 73

(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when:
(a) it is committed recklessly; or
(b) a homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for
which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of
such explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a
person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes
them to be.
At the time the Model Penal Code was drafted the state of the law
with respect to the offense of manslaughter was muddled, to say the
least. Some states divided the crime into two types, voluntary and involuntary.98 Other states did not even attempt to define the crime, simply
incorporating the common law offense. At common law, manslaughter
was a "catch-all" category covering homicides which were not considered murder. This usually involved intentional killings accompanied by
adequate provocation and reckless killings that did not rise to the level
of "depraved heart" murder. 99 Still other states adopted statutes which
divided the crime into degrees. 0 0 Hence, in a very real sense, the major
contribution of the draftsmen here was to bring some uniformity to the
crime in those states which have adopted the Code.
The first type of manslaughter recognized by the Code is the reckless killing of another. Carefully distinguishing negligent homicide, 10 1
the Code mandates a showing that the defendant "consciously disregards a substantial and injustifiable risk." It is considerably more difficult to prove this reckless conduct than to prove negligent acts; the
section requires behavior which is "a gross deviation from the standard
of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe," and proof is required of a "conscious disregard of perceived homicidal risk."' 10 2 If the
risk creation demonstrates "extreme indifference," the crime is murder
rather than manslaughter.
The second type of manslaughter is the killing in the heat of pas98 The traditional view is that voluntary manslaughter is committed when there is an
intent to kill, but no malice aforethought. Involuntary manslaughter is committed without
this intent to kill, but upon otherwise culpable behavior. The division, however, was not so
explicitly recognized as in many of the statutory provisions. See COMMENTARIES, .supranote
1, at 44-48.
99 This form of manslaughter thus required more culpability than for ordinary civil negligence, but less than for the "abandoned heart" murder. Ad. at 44.
loo Foremost among these statutes was the New York law which allowed for first degree
manslaughter when the killing occurred in the heat of passion in a cruel and unusual manner
and second degree manslaughter in the heat of passion, but not by means either cruel or
unusual. N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 1050, 1052 (McKinney 1909) (repealed 1965).
101 Section 210.4 states:- "Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide when it is
committed negligently." The discussion of the commentators in the section is quite helpful,
but reference to it in this article is deleted because of space limitations.
102 COMMENTARIES, ."tpra note 1, at 53.
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sion as a result of severe provocation. Wharton states the policy for allowing a lesser penalty even though the killing was intentional: "As a
concession to human frailty, a killing, which would otherwise constitute
murder, is mitigated to voluntary manslaughter."10 3 The common law
had difficulties defining this aspect of the crime and applying it in a
manner consistent with the underlying policy. The greater the heat of
passion and the more severe the provocation, the greater chance that the
crime would be considered manslaughter rather than murder. The oftstated theory was that if this was the kind of incident which would cause
even a reasonable person to lose self-control the law ought not hold the
defendant to the sanction for murder. The problem, though, was that
"a reasonable person does not kill even when provoked." 10 4 As explained by Wechsler and Michael, the policy rationale stated above is
nonetheless served by allowing mitigation to the manslaughter charge:
[T]he more strongly [most persons] would be moved to kill by circumstances of the sort which provoked the actor to the homicidal act, and the
more difficulty they would experience in resisting the impulse to which he
yielded, the105
less does his succumbing serve to differentiate his character
from theirs.
The Model Penal Code has sought to effectively eliminate three
major problems involved in applying the provocation rules: first, the
requirement that the provocation be sufficient to affect even the reasonable person; second, the view that words alone were insufficient to constitute adequate provocation; and third, the provision that there could
be no break in time between the provocation and the defendant's action.
Determining what a reasonable person would or would not do
under difficult circumstances has never been an easy task for finders of
fact, as seen in the many conflicting negligence cases in tort law. 106 The
reasonable person standard does, however, allow for a specific objective
standard upon which persons could rely. In the criminal context, however, some question was raised as to whether the reasonable person standard should be used to determine adequate provocation. As noted by
the commentators, "[a] taunting attack that would seem trivial to the
§ 153 (14th ed. 1978).
sutpra note 1, at 56.
105 Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of.Homidde 11,37 COLUM. L. REv. 1261,
103 2 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW

104 COMMENTARIES,

1281 (1937).
106 Learned Hand attempted to devise a formulation to assist in the tort negligence decision. He wrote that the negligence determination "is a function of three variables: (1) The
probability [of the result]; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury . . . ; (3) the burden of
adequate precautions." He went on to explain: "Possibly it serves to bring this notion into
relief to state it in algebraic terms: if the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the
burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B [is
less than] PL." United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2nd Cir. 1947).
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ordinary citizen may be extremely threatening to the blind man."' 10 7
Commonwealth v. Stasko' 018 demonstrates well the refusal to consider the
individual traits of the defendant which might have led him to be provoked. The defendant attempted at trial to offer medical evidence to
show his "tendency to have a short temper and erupt in sudden rages."
The trial judge's refusal to allow the evidence into the record was
affirmed:
The purpose of the testimony was to show that, in the case of this particular accused, there was sufficient provocation for the attack. This evidence
was clearly inadmissible: "Our law is quite explicit that the determination
of whether a certain quantum of provocation is sufficient to support the
defense of voluntary manslaughter is purely an objective standard. ..."
The test for adequate provocation is "whether a reasonable man, confronted with this series of events, became impassioned to the extent that his
mind was incapable of cool reflection."' 10 9
Indeed, in one case evidence was refused, even though the court conceded that the evidence would have shown the defendant to be "a man
with a low intelligence quotient and a history of mental disturbance

. . . [as the] objective standard precludes consideration of the innate
peculiarities of the individual defendant." 110
The Code seeks to start anew in this area, for it "sweeps away the
rigid rules that limited provision to certain defined circumstances. Instead, it casts the issue in phrases that have no common-law antecedents
and hence no accumulated doctrinal content.""'

Manslaughter is

shown when the killing is "committed under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse." While the Code does retain the reasonable person standard, this requirement may be met by looking to "the viewpoint of a
person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes
them to be." It thus appears that the Code strikes a healthy balance
between the opposing positions. Some reasonable person standard must
be met, so that the section "preserves the essentially objective character
of the inquiry and erects a barrier against debilitating individualization
of the legal standard." 112 Still, the reasonableness must be assessed
"from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation." "[I]t is clear
that personal handicaps and some external circumstances must be taken
107

COMMENTARIES, suota note 1, at 56.

108 471 Pa. 373, 370 A.2d 350 (1977).

109 Id. at 384, 370 A.2d at 356 (quoting Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 389-90,
292 A.2d 286, 289-90 (1972)).
11o State v. Jackson, 226 Kan. 302, 309, 597 P.2d 255, 259 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 952
(1980). See also Bedder v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1954] 2 All E.R. 801. But see
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Camplin [1978] 2 All E.R. 168.
111 COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 61.
112 Id. at 62.
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into account. Thus, blindness, shock from traumatic injury, and extreme grief are all easily read into the term 'situation.' 1113
The common law also had trouble defining the sort of external activity which would give rise to the provocation defense. The rule traditionally was that "words alone, however scurrilous or insulting, will not
furnish the adequate provocation required."' 114 The major exception to
the "mere words" rule, as noted by the commentators, "concerned informational words disclosing a fact that would have been adequate provocation had the actor observed it himself," 115 such as the case in which
the defendant is told, "I just killed your child." Under the code, no
explicit rule is promulgated with respect to "mere words." The Code
draftsmen recognized that the important question "cannot be resolved
successfully by categorization of conduct. It must be confronted directly
on the facts of each case." 116 In most cases words alone will not be sufficient piovocation. In the highly unusual case, however, mere words
might be sufficient to cause even the reasonable person to lose selfcontrol.117
At common law a manslaughter claim was not allowed if there was
a cooling off period between the provocation and the killing. The final
contribution of the Code in this area is the elimination of this "sudden
provocation" element. The reason for the strict rule was that "[f]or the
reasonable man, at least, passion subsides and reason reasserts its sway
as the provoking event grows stale.""18 The most famous case in the
area, discussed by the commentators, is State v. Cunagias119 where "the
deceased committed sodomy on the unconscious defendant and subsequently spread the news of his accomplishment. Those who learned of
the event taunted and ridiculed the defendant until he finally lost con20
trol and killed his assailant some two weeks after the sodomy."'
This theory of the cumulative effect of reminders of former wrongs, not of
new acts of provocation by the deceased, is contrary to the idea of sudden
anger as understood in the doctrine of mitigation. In the nature of the
thing sudden anger cannot be cumulative. A provocation which does not
cause instant resentment, but which is only resented after being thought
upon and brooded over, is not a provocation sufficient in law to reduce
13 Id.
114 State v. Castro, 92 N.M. 585, 590, 592 P.2d 185, 187 (1979) (quoting State v. Nevares, 36

N.M. 41, 44-45, 7 P.2d 933, 935 (1932)).
115 COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 58.
116 Id. at 61.
117 As in People v. Borchers, 50 Cal. 2d 321, 325 P.2d 97 (1958), where the wife told her
husband, the defendant, that she had been unfaithful, asked him to kill her and her four-yearold child, and taunted him by calling him a "chicken."
118 COMMENTARIES,supra note 1, at 59.
119 88 Wash. 304, 153 P. 9 (1915).
120 COMMENTARIES, sur
ia note 1, at 59.
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The problem with the rule is that the law should not necessarily
distinguish between the person who instantly reacts to the provocation
and the person who broods for a week or two and then responds. The
Code recognizes this, and does not set out a specific rule with respect to
the suddenness of the situation. The validity of the Code's position is
seen in cases such as People v. Beny.' 22 The victim in that case, defendant's wife, was a suicidally inclined young woman who pursued her
death wish by "sexually arousing him and taunting him into jealous
rages in an unconscious desire to provoke him into killing her and thus
consummating her desire for suicide."'1 23 For a two week period she continually harassed defendant with sexual taunts and incitements, and repeated references to her involvement with another man. Finally, the
defendant strangled her to death. Under the "sudden passion" rule the
defendant would not have been able to prove his defense. 124 The court,
however, recognized that the
two-week period of provocatory conduct by his wife ...

could arouse a

passion of jealousy, pain and sexual rage in an ordinary man of average
disposition such as to cause him to act rashly from this passion....
The Attorney General contends that the killing could not have been
done in the heat of passion because there was a cooling period ....
However, the long course of provocatory conduct, which had resulted in
intermittent outbreaks of rage under specific provocation in the past,
125
reached its final culmination ....
The Model Penal Code treatment of manslaughter is a "modified
121 88 Wash. at 314, 153 P. at 14. See also People v. Wilson, 3 Ill. App. 3d 481, 486, 278
N.E.2d 473, 477 (1972) ("To reduce an unlawful killing from murder to voluntary manslaughter, the sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation cannot be followed by a period of time sufficient for the passion to cool and the voice of reason to be
heard.").
122 18 Cal. 2d 504, 556 P.2d 777, 134 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1976).
123 Id. at 514, 556 P.2d at 780, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
124 The Model Penal Code requires the government to prove the elements of the voluntary
manslaughter offense, though some states required the accused to prove the provocation
claim by a preponderance of the evidence. As the commentators point out, there has been
some question as to the constitutionality of placing this burden on the defendant. In Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) the Supreme Court struck down a state statute which
required the defendant to prove provocation by preponderance of the evidence. But see Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) where the Court upheld the constitutionality of
requiring the defendant to shoulder the burden under a state statute which referred to emotional distrubance. The Court found that the emotional disturbance element, unlike the
provocation aspect in Mfullany, raised an affirmative defense. "The Model Code takes...
the. . . position advanced as a constitutional rule by Mr. Justice Powell's dissent in Patterson,
that, once the defendant has come forward with some evidence of extreme emotional disturbance, the burden of proving its non-existence should shift to the prosecution." COMMENTARals, supra note 1, at 63-64 n.58. See also supra note 93.
125 18 Cal. 3d at 515-16, 556 P.2d at 780-81, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 419.
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and substantially enlarged version of the rule of provocation." 1 26 This
expansion is thoroughly justified, however, for it realistically allows the
important questions regarding mitigation of the crime to be placed
before the jury without any strict categories as to time or type of behavior required. It allows the jury to apply a standard which is both subjective and objective. In short, it is a substantial improvement over the
127
uncertainties of the common law.
I turn now to another situation. Suppose the defendant shoots and
kills the victim, believing that the victim was about to shoot and kill
him. The defendant's belief, though genuinely held, is unreasonable.
Had this mistaken belief been reasonable, the defendant would be able
to raise a complete, or "perfect," claim of self-defense. Under the traditional provocation rule, the hypothetical defendant would be convicted
of murder because he had the intent to kill and could not claim to have
been aroused by the "heat of passion." Recognizing this "as an indefensible position"' 12 8 the Code has adopted a version of the "imperfect"
right of self-defense. The standard version, as enacted in Illinois, focuses
attention on the defendant's sincere, but unreasonable belief: "A person
who intentionally or knowingly kills an individual commits voluntary
manslaughter if at the time of the killing he believes the circumstances
to be such that, if they existed, would justify or exonerate the killing
. .,but his belief is unreasonable."' 129 The Code treatment of the im126 COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 60.

127 The Commentaries also discuss the diminished responsibility concept. The commentators clearly support the notion that "all evidence logically relevant to establishing the actor's

state of mind" should be admissible. COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 66. This, of course,
reiterates the point that the individual characteristics of the defendant ought to be considered
to some extent in determining provocation and the reaction of the defendant. With respect to
the question of allowing diminished responsibility to reduce murder to manslaughter, however, the commentators are far less certain:
Recognizing diminished responsibility as an alternative ground for reducing murder to
manslaughter undermines this scheme. Unlike provocation, diminished responsibility is
entirely subjective in character. It looks into the actor's mind to see whether he should
be judged by a lesser standard than that applicable to ordinary men. It recognizes the
defendant's own mental disorder or emotional instability as a basis for partially excusing
his conduct. This position undoubtedly achieves a closer relation between criminal liability and moral guilt.
Id. at 71. The commentators conclude that the Code does not recognize diminished responsibility as a distinct category of mitigation, but "leaves the issue, together with many others, as
part of the generic problem of determining the extent to which the actor's individual characteristics should be taken into account in the formula." Id.at 73.
128 Id.
2d 302, 309,
129 ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-2(b) (1979). See also People v. Joyner, 50 Ill.
278 N.E.2d 756, 759 (1972):
Occasionally a defendant who raises a defense of self-defense to a charge of murder is
convicted of manslaughter ... .The difference between a justified killing under selfdefense and the one not justified, amounting to voluntary manslaughter, is that in the
former instance the belief that the use of force is necessary is reasonable under the circumstances, and in the latter, the belief is unreasonable.
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perfect defense is preferable to this version simply because it is more
precise. It allows for a manslaughter conviction in the situation discussed above, but specifies that the defendant could be guilty of crimi30
nal homicide if his belief was formed recklessly or negligently.
The final area in the law of manslaughter in which the Code has
made an important contribution is the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule,
an offshoot of the felony murder rule. As with felony murder, the broad
scope of the rule provided that it was a homicide offense if the defendant
caused a death while committing, or attempting to commit, a crime.
Although a number of courts have narrowly construed the rule 13' it is,
nevertheless, "objectionable on the same ground as the felony-murder
rule. It dispenses with proof of culpability and imposes liability for a
serious crime without reference to the actor's state of mind."' 132 To be
sure, it is even worse than the felony murder rule, for the defendant may
be charged with a homicide offense even though he may not have committed any serious offense and might not be chargeable with generally
133
reckless conduct.
People v. Nelson 134 is perhaps the most extreme application of the
misdemeanor-manslaughter rule. The defendant was an elderly man,
formerly a tenant, who eventually became the owner of his building.
Two persons were killed in a fire which occurred in the building. The
government showed that a violation of the building law, a misdemeanor, caused the deaths. The defendant contended that he did not
know of the building law and thus had not acted in a reckldss fashion.
The trial judge would not let the jury consider the issue of the defend135
ant's knowledge, and the Court of Appeals of New York affirmed.
The dissenter disagreed:
130 It is difficult to imagine many situations in which the defendant would be able to state
a legitimate self-defense argument wher he was reckless as to the mistaken belief in the necessity. If recklessness requires a conscious disregard of a substantial risk with respect to the
necessity of defense, the prosecution may properly argue that he truly did not believe he was
entitled to use force and hence ought to be guilty of murder.
131 For example, some states apply the rule only to misdemeanors mala in se but not to
misdemeanors mala prhibia. Others refuse to apply the rule where the underlying crime is
one of strict liability. But see infra text accompanying notes 134-38. The commentators discuss these limitations in some detail. COMMENTARIES, Jupra note 1, at 76-77.
132 Id. at 77.
133 In a situation involving a serious crime such as rape or armed robbery, it would not be
difficult for the finder of fact to conclude that the defendant had consciously disregarded a
very serious risk, proven by his involvement in such a violent crime. The death of the victim
could more justifiably be considered criminal homicide.
134 309 N.Y. 231, 128 N.E.2d 391 (1955).
135 The court stated:
It is undeniable that a tremendous duty is placed upon the owners and those in charge of
property under the applicable section of the Multiple Dwelling Law; however, it is quite
apparent that the Legislature intended the burden to be onerous so that owners would
be impressed with the consequences flowing from violation of the statute, which viola-
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If awareness of the misdemeanor is held to be irrelevant, the basis for
guilt of manslaughter is eliminated ...
"... When there is a general intent to do evil, in other words, of
which evil the wrong actually done may be looked upon as a probable
intent is to be regarded as
incident, then the party having such general
136
having intended the particular wrong."
Nelson demonstrates how indefensible the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule is. Even though the defendant may have committed the substantive crime, it is wrong to hold him for a homicide offense without a
showing of a culpable state of mind. Unlike the presumption adopted in
the felony-murder area, 3 7 the approach of the Code draftsmen here is
straightforward. They expressly abolish the misdemeanor-manslaughter
rule. This approach is quite proper. If the defendant acted in an otherwise reckless or negligent fashion, he may be charged with homicide. If
he has not acted culpably, even though guilty of a misdemeanor, he
should not be brought within the reach of a manslaughter statute. 13,
CONCLUSION

The approach of the Model Penal Code in the area of criminal
homicide is illustrative of the general approach of the Code. There are
several difficult subjects which the draftsmen have chosen to deal with
in a direct and clear fashion; others have been avoided or obfuscated.
For example, the draftsmen were careful to define with clarity the elements of the crime of manslaughter, avoiding the common law difficulties. They explicitly rejected those murder statutes which had divided
the offense into degrees. On the other hand, they have failed to come to
terms with important definitions such as "death," they have refused to
confront the possibility of a feticide statute, and have only partially responded to the intense criticism of the felony murder.
The great worth of the Code cannot, however, be evaluated by
looking to such specifics. The Code has had tremendous influence on
the criminal law in this country and has brought considerable clarity
tions could so readily endanger human life in the congested conditions under which peopie must live in the City of New York.
Id. at 236, 128 N.E.2d at 394.
136 Id. at 239, 128 N.E.2d at 395 (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 WHARTON'S
CRIMINAL LAW § 157 (12th ed. 1932)).
137 See .wrtta text accompanying notes 73-97.

138 Related to the misdemeanor manslaughter rule is the so-called intent to injure rule. As
stated by the commentators, many jurisdictions have provisions in which "one who caused
the death of another by a simple battery was generally guilty of manslaughter or of involuntary manslaughter where that was a separate category, however improbable the fatal result."
COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 78. The imposition of homicide sanctions makes little sense
absent some reckless or negligent conduct apart from the battery itself. The Code rejects the
intent to injure rule and simply focuses on whether the defendant's action is reckless or negligent in determining which, if any, homicide category should be applied.

836

BOOK REVIEWS

[Vol. 73

afid uniformity to an area of the law in which both were notoriously
absent. The efforts of Professors Low and Jeffries will serve further to
clarify and explain the rationale for the Code, allowing lawyers, judges
and legislators to understand the positions taken by the draftsmen and
intelligently to decide whether such positions are supportable. The
commentators' efforts are both substantial and significant. By updating
the explanations for the Code provisions they have provided an invaluable aid to those engaged in the administration of criminal justice.
PAUL MARCUS
PROFESSOR OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS COLLEGE OF LAW

PRISONS AND POLITICS. By RichardA. McGee. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1981. Pp. xiv, 162. $21.95.

Those in the business of crisis prediction should have little difficulty
recognizing one that's as sure a bet as any for the 1980s-the crisis of
America's burgeoning prisons. The criminal justice system responded to
the crime explosion of the 1960s and '70s, a period in which the homicide rate doubled, with an unprecedented expansion in our prison and
jail populations-from 356,000 in 1970 to 530,000 by 1977. With most
indicators pointing to a continuation of the upward trend in inmate
populations, only the most optimistic and least informed could not be
concerned about the potential for upheaval in our nation's prisons by
1990.
Under such circumstances, we would be foolish not to do our best
to understand the lessons of previous episodes of turmoil in our prisons,
as well as a few episodes of success that have occurred here and there, so
as to avoid repeating past errors and make use of what has worked. In
sharing his treasure of personal experience as a prison administrator in
the states of New York, Washington, and California, Richard McGee, in
Prisons and Politics, provides the means to enable others to understand
such lessons. McGee's account of the problems of prison administration
and how he has dealt with them is both thoughtful and thorough. His
grasp of the fundamental issues is deep:
Public officials ... know instinctively that their prisons are unflattering reflections of their cultures. All societies have difficulty reconciling
their desire to be humane and compassionate with their exasperation with
overt antisocial behavior. To hurt and heal, to banish and forgive, to destroy and rebuild: these difficult and contradictory concepts come face to
face in their starkest form in prison. (p. 84.)
McGee's credentials in prison administration are second to none.
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In a profession in which the best one normally does is to avoid catastrophe and survive for a couple of years, McGee has managed to draw the
highest praise as a public official. His decades of tenure and accomplishment as California's first Director of the Department of Corrections
alone attest to his superior administrative skill. Governor Earl Warren
wrote in 1974 that he had never had a better administrator work for him
in his fifty-plus years of public service.
McGee understands that inmates are human beings, yet that prisons have a responsibility to control them. He understands that the caseby-case perspective that the public is exposed to by the mass media and
in detective stories provides no basis for effective management, yet that
the fine print of statistical tables of government reports has its limitations too. He understands well the irrational public pressures to simultaneously reduce crime, reduce problems in prisons, and reduce prison
budgets: "punish, but be kind and do it cheaply." (p. 78.) He understands the absolute importance of order and efficiency in prison administration: "Of all institutions, public or private, probably none has the
imperative to be organized as tightly and operated as efficiently as the
prison. Not to do so inevitably results in political and legal attacks from
the outside, or blowups and insurrections from within." (p. 78.)
Above all, Prisons and Politics demonstrates an understanding that
effective prison administration demands high levels of consciousness
about both internal prison management and the relationships between
state correctional agencies and the external political forces that control
those agencies: the governor, the state legislature, the press, and others.
The book gives a documentary account of McGee's experience in dealing with each of these forces and offers a prescription for the prison administrator in dealing with each. Separate chapters on the
administrator's relations with the executive branch, legislative branch,
and the media conclude with lists of personally time-tested dos and
don'ts for the administrator.
McGee also describes the major obstacles to operating successful
prison industries (e.g., opposition by organized labor) and the importance of nonetheless attempting to do so; dealing with prison congestion
(there are no easy answers, especially for short-term congestion
problems); and the existence of irrational and inequitable sentencing
practices and their harmful effects on the process of clarifying the role of
the prison.
While the book is less a scholarly discourse on corrections than it is
a presentation of McGee's insights on prison administration that derive
from his experience, McGee's approach is nonetheless objective. Indeed,
his success as an administrator may have derived largely from his insistence on making informed decisions and setting policy on the basis of
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empirical evidence. He points out that the administrator who is similarly oriented must overcome "the fact that, historically, the two most
influential professions in crime control and corrections have been those
of the lawyers and the clergy. Both are respected and learned, but
neither can be said to be devoted to the scientific method." (p. 135.) It is
no coincidence that McGee was instrumental in the design and establishment of California's criminal justice statistics bureau.
The book abounds in aphorisms and good one-liners. Two examples: "Be honest, stay honest, and look honest." (p. 39.) "As the district
attorney of San Francisco once said when asked why he did not publish
his statistics on case dispositions, 'why should I let the press shoot me
with my own pistol?'" (p. 136.)
PrionsandPoliics is not without minor shortcomings. McGee tends
to ignore a preponderance of evidence produced by researchers at Rand,
INSLAW, the University of Pennsylvania, Carnegie-Mellon University,
and elsewhere that there are at least modest crime control effects associated with the incapacitation of the most crime prone offenders (e.g., at
page 81 he reports: "there is no solid evidence that it makes any difference in the crime rate whether burglars are kept fifteen or thirty
months."). He mentions a predicament for our nation's jails that resembles our prison predicament, but he says little about the extent to which
his prescriptions for prisons apply to problems of jail management. In
addition, he devotes only a single sentence to the problem of the inmate's family. (p. 66.) These deficiencies, however, are of no conse-

quence when placed against the book's importance as medicine for
dealing with the problems of our nation's beleaguered state prison
systems.
In the end, McGee remains optimistic about prison administration:
In spite of the confusion and lack of direction that seems to prevail
among correctional workers and leaders in the final decades of this century, there are reasons to feel renewed hope for corrections as a profession.
Certainly for those who thrive on challenge, this is where one can find it.

(p. 155.)
McGee's Prisonsand Politics is an important contribution to the cor-

rections literature. Its primary value lies in the lessons it tells to prison
administrators for the 1980s and beyond. If experience is truly the best
teacher, prison officials will learn eventually from their own successes
and failures. In the meantime, they can benefit from Richard McGee's
deep well of experience.
BRIAN FORST
DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH

INSLAW, INC.
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By Doug Magee. New York: Pilgrim Press, 1980.

Pp. 358. $10.95.
The death penalty has long been the sovereign state's ultimate
power over the citizen. The solemn procession from the condemned's
cell to the place of execution is the last act of a play written to legitimate
the legal order. Beginning with the prosecution's opening statement to
the jury and reaching its zenith at the moment of execution, this drama
evokes the symbols of justice and obedience to the sovereign.
Some 600 people await execution. They live in America's "death
rows," prison cell blocks housing the condemned. From death row it is
usually a short walk to the gas chamber or electric chair, the most commonly used methods of execution. That final walk, however, may come
several years after sentencing, pending the outcome of lengthy appeals.
Meanwhile the condemned must wait in a small, scantily furnished cell,
uncertain of how long his life will remain in the balance.
Doug Magee is a journalist who has inter-iewed many inmates who
reside in death row. In Slow Coming Dark he presents interviews with
twelve of the condemned. It is not clear why these twelve were selected
and Magee does not contend that they are statistically representative of
all those sentenced to die.
The interviews are brisk and stark. If the contemplation of death is
necessary to appreciate life, these interviews provide the living with little
inspiration. While the condemned have been sobered by their stay on
death row, they express more anxiety about their uncertain futures than
reflection on their pasts. Some admit their guilt; others do not. While
they regret the pain brought to the murdered and their kin, they see
themselves more as pawns than as wrongdoers.. These people are not
members of organized crime. Nor are they "independent" professional
criminals. In the world of crime the twelve are small fry, with sporadic,
minor criminal careers. If they are different from the law abiding, it is
because they are losers, with pasts cluttered by poverty, broken homes,
or other personal losses. Upon conviction of murder, they dealt themselves the final joker.
As losers the inmates interviewed in Slow Coming Dark possess a
common bond with the population of America's death rows. The arbitrariness of chance afflicts all social classes, but some more than others.
Social tables of chance do not exist apart from social class; the boundaries of our lives are significantly marked by the social class we were born
into, and the closer one is to the centrifuge of wealth and power the
more likely that the roulette will turn in his favor. Most of the 600-odd
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condemned are poor.' Many are members of ethnic and racial minority
groups.2 The poor and the black possess no monopoly on murderous
intent, but their frustrations and anxieties cannot be readily shed without injury to themselves and to a society that speaks of inalienable freedom while forgetting that the capacity to achieve and acquire
necessitates resources beyond the reach of the lower class.
The prominence of the loser on death row is not new. Historically,
unpopular political, ethnic, and racial groups have inequitably suffered
the death penalty.3 For example, fifty-four percent of those executed
between 1930 and 1961 were blacks, whose race comprised but eleven
percent of the population. 4 Bias has operated at all segments of American society, and it is not surprising that it should afflict the criminal
justice system. 5 The caprice of capital punishment was recognized in
Furman v. Georgia,6 in which the United States Supreme Court struck
down sentencing practices giving either the judge or jury virtually uncontrolled discretion in determining whether capital offenders should
live or die. But when the Court later ruled that the presence of sentencing standards could remove its objections to capital punishment, 7 the
Justices failed to grasp that procedural protections need not lead to substantive justice. As Yale law professor Charles Black, Jr., has observed, 8
sentencing standards are deficient on three levels. First, they work as
pseudo-standards, having little ability to resolve issues of blameworthiness that are more subject to metaphysical examination than delineated
criteria. Ask Doug McCray, one of the subjects of Slow Coming Dark. A
young black on Florida's death row, he had the misfortune of being sentenced by a judge who set his penalty at death to "set an example," 9
even though McCray's jury had recommended life in prison. Second,
sentencing standards do not address the unbounded prosecutorial discretion in charging and plea bargaining. Third, sentencing standards
ignore the life and death impact of an attorney's skills, especially when
many defendants are represented by inexperienced and overworked
public defenders.
The persistent question asked by the condemned of Slow Coming
I D. MAGEE, SLOW COMING DARK 3 (1980).
2 BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUST.
STATITIcs-1980 524 (1981).

3 See Wolfgang & Riedel, Race, JudicialDiscretion, and the Death Penalty, 407 ANNALS 119
(1973).
4 E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSY, CRIMINOLOGY 307 (9th ed. 1974).
5 See C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE

84-91
6
7
8
9

(1974).
408 U.S. 238 (1972), reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972).
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976).
C. BLACK, supra note 5, at 14-22.
D. MAGEE, supra note 1, at 27.
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Dark is what purpose their executions will achieve. Phil Brasfield is on
the Texas death row: "I can't figure out how capital punishment
changes anything or makes anything better. . . . If a man steals something you don't go out and steal something of his to show that stealing is
wrong. It just doesn't make any sense."' 0 Although capital punishment
may find its touchstone in the vengeful heart, state executions are best
understood as one of the mechanisms of power. As French social historian Michel Fouchault has noted," 1 these mechanisms are not so much
repressive instruments as productive, definitional strategies that induce
desires, shape discourse, and administer our self-concept. These are the
strategies of public health, national defense, social welfare, crime control, and a host of other social institutions that interweave the public
and private life. The condemned are immersed by the definitional quality of power: their psychology is defined by criminologists; their legal
status defined by the courts; their public lives defined by the media;
their daily existence defined by the prison. Amidst all this, the drama of
trial, sentencing, and appeal sanctifies the mechanism immersing them,
from which death is the last escape.
JAMES

E.

ROBERTSON

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY
MANKATO STATE UNIVERSITY

By George B. Vold. Prepared by Thomas
J. Bernard. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979. Pp. xiii,
433. $14.95.

THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY.

George Vold's Theoretical Criminology, published in 1958, is one of
the most highly regarded texts in the field and was sufficiently successful
to have gone through eight printings. As testimony to the quality of the
original work it is still a valued reference, even though Vold never revised the text. Though Vold died in 1967, the original publishers decided to commission a revised edition to be compiled by another scholar,
Thomas Bernard, and to market the revised work under the same title as
the original with the name of Void prominently displayed and, in
smaller print, the notation "Second Edition prepared by Thomas J. Bernard." Do the publishers violate any ethical standard by publication
under these circumstances of this "second edition"?
The most successful example of this publishing strategy, where the
10 Id. at 72.
11 M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND
POWER/KNoWLEDGE

37-62 (1980).

PUNISH

219

(1979);

M.

FOUCAULT,

BOOK REVIEWS

[Vol. 73

successful work of a deceased author is kept current (and therefore marketable) is Criminology, which was originally written by Edwin Sutherland under the title Principles of Ciminology in 1924. Sutherland was
responsible for the first four editions of the text, published before his
death in 1950. Then Donald Cressey appended his name to Sutherland's and published another six editions, the latest appearing in 1978,
under "joint authorship." The commercial success of "Sutherland and
Cressey" is sufficient evidence that sustaining the usefulness of a text in
this way is ethically tolerable to many criminology instructors.
In his preface to the second edition of TheoreticalCriminology Edward
Sagarin argues implicitly that, whereas a literary or artistic classic
should remain untouched, other classic works which have primarily a
didactic function can justifiably be modified. From this point of view
the work is treated as a tool, always capable of being improved, rather
than a finished work of art. Perhaps Sagarin is right; a tool, after all,
need not be a work of art as well. Every text will soon become outdated
and economy of effort argues for revising the best ones rather than starting anew every few years.
Let me suggest a way out of this quandry. Scholars and the publishing industry could agree on a standard form of reference to works
issued in revised form when the revisions are done by a second authorsomething like including the term "revised" in the title and attributing
authorship to both contributors (e.g., Theoretical Criminology Revised by
Vold and Bernard). If such a standard form becomes accepted, confusion about authorship will be reduced and students who have the interest will be signaled to go back to the original work to obtain the
statement by the original author. I doubt whether this strategy will
stimulate a dramatic rise in books published this way. Few texts attain
such enduring prominence as to make sustaining them attractive to publishers. However, maybe legitimizing the process of posthumous revision might promote the continued refinement of the very best, or at least
most popular, texts. For authors who do not want their work tampered
with after they are not around to object, it would be a small matter to
include a prohibition in their publishing contract.
Now for the book itself. Not only is the essential emphasis of the
original Void retained, but for every topic Vold covered, nearly all the
original wording is retained as well. Bernard has made three types of
changes to the original, all of which are done skillfully. First, he has
documented Vold's statements with new evidence. An interesting note
on advances in the field is that none of Vold's major conclusions required substantial modification in the light of research conducted in the
twenty-one years between the two editions. The reader who has used
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Vold all these years likely will be pleased with the thoroughness of the
updated documentation.
Bernard's second contribution was to include important theories
and writings which Void had failed to include, most notably Thorsten
Sellin's theory of culture conflict and crime and Robert Merton's work
on anomie. Both works had appeared twenty years before the first edition of Void and had attracted widespread attention. For that matter
Durkheim is not even mentioned in Void. Bernard corrects the omission
with a whole chapter on anomie, including its influence on federal anticrime policy in the 1960s. Only the ethnographic aspect of Chicago
School criminology received much attention in Void. The other important aspect, human ecology, mentioned briefly in the earlier work, gets
its own well-deserved chapter in Bernard.
The third important modification which appears in the new edition
is the addition of important new evidence and, in a few cases, whole subspecialties within and focusing on criminology. The controversy of the
relationship between delinquency, race and intelligence is an important
development treated in a new section. Biological criminology has been
greatly expanded. Important new twin studies are added as well as entirely new sections on learning disabilities, chromosomal studies and autonomic nervous system functioning.
There are some shortcomings in the new edition. A new two-page
section on the prediction of dangerousness is, curiously, all the attention
paid specifically to violent crime. Though one could excuse this scant
treatment on the grounds that Void excluded the topic originally, still
the failure to consider theory and evidence on this phenomenon which is
so central to public concern and social control efforts is a serious flaw in
the comprehensiveness of the work. Instead, Bernard followed Vold's
lead in devoting separate chapters to victimless crime (Vold referred to
them as "personality-problem types of crime") and white-collar crime.
Symbolic interactionism, applied to criminology virtually entirely
after 1960, is not mentioned in Vold. Bernard's new chapter on the
topic is somewhat unsatisfying in that it does not follow the successful
pattern set in other chapters of presenting in detail the body of evidence
testing the theory. Bernard concludes without presenting sufficient evidence that, "it seems probable that labeling does not create more crime
than it eliminates" (citing Tittle). (p. 266.)
Bernard wisely reprinted without change Vold's Chapter 11,
"Group Conflict Theory as Explanation of Crime," the seventeen page
section in which Void, for the first time in a text, analyzed crime as a
product of social conflict. Bernard then added a separate chapter on
contemporary conflict theory, which satisfactorily covers the basic prem-
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ises but becomes unnecessarily involved in the distinctions between
"conflict theory" (Bernard means pluralist conflict theory) and Marxist
theory. Unfortunately discussion of this issue occupies space that might
better have been devoted to tests and applications, and discussion of the
difficulty of testing and applying, conflict theories. The prominence
given Richard Quinney's work and the brief highly critical treatment of
the British Marxists makes this chapter unlikely to satisfy contemporary
conflict theorists.
A final note on style: In deciding to retain Vold's style and, largely,
his words, Bernard kept the good and the bad. The overall style is interesting and clear, however, readers who are at all sensitive to the issue
will see both editions as highly sexist in both style and content. The
male form of the personal pronoun is used exclusively and in several
instances we are treated to distinctions made by "separating the men
from the boys." More seriously, no mention is made of women as either
offenders (except for one paragraph on the incidence of prostitution) or
victims. In both editions we read of Lombroso's persistent positivism
and objectivity. His untested but firmly asserted assumptions about the
inherent moral inferiority of women are not mentioned. Perhaps we can
understand this sexism in Void; Bernard should have known better. He
should have included at least a section on the prevelance and differences
between crimes of men and women as well as a review of contemporary
explanations of the criminality of women. Void, the conflict theorist,
surely would have understood the implications for criminology of women as a minority group.
The strength of this book, as in the original, is the excellent discussion of criminological theories, their intellectual origins and related research. The last chapters on victimless crime, criminal organization,
white-collar crime, theory as the basis for research, and corrections, are
weak by comparison to the rest of the book. Their weakness is their
brevity and the absence of a systematic effort to integrate theory with
description.
This text is well suited to use in upper level undergraduate courses
(if the students have sufficiently well developed reading skills) and graduate courses on criminological theory. Thanks mainly to the skill of
George Vold, Theoretical Cniminolog contains the best review of criminological theory (excluding conflict theory) available. Thomas Bernard
has successfully brought this classic text up-to-date.
JOSEPH

E. JACOBY

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY
BOWLING GREEN STATE UNIVERSITY
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PSYCHOLOGY AND

LAW:

CAN JUSTICE

SURVIVE THE SOCIAL SCI-

By DanielN Robinson. New York: Oxford University Press,
1980. Pp. viii, 221. $6.95.

ENCES?

The subject of this book is an analysis of the ways in which the
"psychosocial perspective," engendered by the social sciences, has influenced the administration of justice. Courts of law have increasingly
come to be viewed as "social" institutions, and the claims that the social
sciences are genuine sciences have also been largely accepted. As a result, the courts have increasingly adopted the psychosocial perspective
in their deliberations and rulings.
The author argues that both of these tendencies are unsound. Not
only is it "perilous" to view the courts as social institutions (and thus as
responsive to changing ideological currents), but the notion that the social sciences are in fact sciences is "utterly unwarranted." In articulating this thesis, the author selects for discussion a limited number of
contemporary legal issues, issues which he asserts have been rendered
incoherent by the adoption of the psychosocial perspective. These issues
include "the 'insanity' defense, challenges to testamentary capacity, the
protections afforded voluntarily and involuntarily committed patients,
the position of the courts on psychological tests and on the legal standing of the defenseless" (p. viii)-i.e., fetuses, persons judged to be insane,
and incurables.
The book is undoubtedly a tour deforce and is sure to stimulate considerable discussion. Every issue is approached with erudition, precision
and wit. The author has mounted a devastating and highly plausible
attack on the subtle erosion of timeless legal-moral principles by the testimony of psychiatrists and social scientists. In the concluding chapter,
a number of excellent suggestions are made as to the way in which
courts should treat psychosocial testimony in the future.
Of all the topics discussed by Robinson, that of insanity and criminal responsibility is probably of greatest interest to the criminologist.
His general approach in each chapter is to begin by reviewing the broad
historical and philosophical background of the issue at hand, and then
progressively to narrow his focus to a review of specific legal cases and
arguments. In Chapter 1, for instance, he argues that Man alone among
living creatures can be considered a "moral" being. This means in part
that human actions are governed by intentions rather than causes; and
Man, unlike other species, can conceive of what is universally good and
desirable, and believe that such a state of affairs ought to exist. Turning
to the role of social scientists in the courtroom, Robinson argues that the
testimony provided by social scientists is not scientific, since genuine sciences frame their explanations in terms of universal laws, whereas the

BOOK REVIEWS

[Vol. 73

social sciences do not, in fact, have any universal laws. The issue of
causality is, moreover, separate from the question of the offender's guilt
or innocence, since the latter is concerned only with his or her intentions
and reasons.
Robinson then proceeds to analyze the issue of criminal responsibility and crimes of violence. He reviews the intellectual history of the
insanity defense and notes that over the past two hundred years there
has been a continuous erosion, rejection and revision of the ancient standard of mens rea. Moral guilt has been transformed into a mental disease-insanity. Initially, the concept of insanity was used to refer to
individuals with the intellectual level of an idiot. As such, it had few
practical applications to criminals. However, as the criteria were modified and extended to include "irresistible impulse," "morbid delusion,"
and "temporary ihsanity," virtually anyone could be exonerated of a
violent crime. Disease, in its true meaning, is something palpable and
physiological, and of such severity as to place the individual's well-being
and health in jeopardy. Yet, all too often in contemporary courts, the
act of the criminal is not shown to be a consequence of disease, but the
disease is established by virtue of the act. Furthermore, "expert" testimony on the part of social scientists is not only frequently trite (e.g.,
"unemployment is frustrating") but also irrelevant to the issue of
whether the defendant is suffering from a genuine disease, and one that
actually impinges on his conduct to such an extent as to cause him to
commit a crime. However, there is at present no genuine science of socalled mental disease, only a "practical knowledge of tests of doubtful
validity" (p. 63), and a clinical knowledge of some human eccentricities.
Such "evidence" of mental disease as is presented consists of opinions
rather than pertinent facts, the only exception being epidemiologic findings. Epidemiological findings, however, have no bearing on whether
the criminal's mind is, in fact, diseased in any legally or morally significant respect. The net effect of all this, Robinson concludes, is that justice has been put at the mercy of theory, while in the courtroom an
"anarchy of speculation" has become the rule. Hence, this part of justice "cannot survive the social sciences" (p. 63).
For this reviewer, Robinson correctly identifies some of the abuses
of sociological findings in the courtroom. He also argues convincingly
that justice is being eroded by the intrusion of the psychosocial perspective in trials involving the insanity defense. On the other hand, this
erosion of justice cannot be blamed entirely on the inadequacies of the
social sciences. It could also be due to the ancient legal concept of criminal responsibility; in particular, to the distinction between voluntary
and involuntary conduct. Voluntary acts are those for which the agent
can be held responsible; involuntary acts are those for which the agent
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cannot be held responsible. Given that individuals who are considered
legally responsible for their actions are found guilty and punished,
whilst others, who may have committed the very same acts, but supposedly during a period of insanity, are found "not guilty by reason of insanity" and possibly acquitted, it is only natural that defendants should
try to avoid a guilty verdict by claiming insanity. Thus it is not surprising that efforts have been made, over the years, to extend the grounds
for insanity.
Instead of assuming, however, that human actions are mostly
"willed"--and here we are arguing against Robinson-the uneasy distinction between voluntary and involuntary conduct could be bypassed
altogether by assuming determinism. Determinism, however, does not imply fatalism or inevitability; and, just as important, to "explain" behavior in terms of risk (or causal) factors is not necessarily to explain it away
or.excuse it. We would therefore agree with Robinson when he states
that justice
is also not served by... exoneration simply on the finding of a predisposing 'cause.' Such exoneration not only teaches bad lessons and violates
basic covenants, but it does little for its intended beneficiary. If he is a
fraud, it repays his fraud. If he is not, it reinforces what is already a diminished capacity for self-control, ....
(p. 209).
According to the point of view suggested by this reviewer, individuals
should be held legally responsible for all their actions, irrespective of
their mental state. It should also be up to them to learn about "risk
factors" (e.g., the criminogenic effects of alcohol) and to intervene in
causal processes so as to prevent criminal or other irresponsible acts from
occurring.
Where the testimony of social scientists and other "experts" is introduced, it would not be for the assessment of responsibility and guilt, but
(as others have suggested), it would assist the judge in imposing an appropriate sentence. Thus, at least so far as the insanity defense is concerned, we would argue (contra Robinson) that justice can survive the
social sciences, but only if the legal system radically co-opts the deterministic assumptions of the social sciences. On the other hand, justice
might not survive if the courts attempt to restrict or disbar the testimony
of social scientists, or continue much longer to pretend that homo sapiens
alone among the other millions of plant and animal species stands above
and beyond the realm of universal determinism.
ANTHONY R. MAWSON
PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

LOYOLA UNIVERsITY
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THE PRISON AND THE FACTORY; ORIGINS OF THE PENITENTIARY SYS-

By Dario Melossi and Massimo Pavarini. Translated from the
Italian by Glynis Cousin. London: The MacMillan Press Ltd.,
1981. Pp. xii, 243. $19.95.
TEM.

The widely acknowledged "crisis" of the prison system which made
itself felt in the form of ubiquitous prison revolts and a growing "decarceration" consensus throughout the West in the early seventies, has
recently produced some remarkable work on the beginnings of the penitentiary institution. Three studies in particular stand out in the field:
Michel Foucault's DismNine and Punish which appeared in English in
1977, Michael Ignatieff's A Just Measure of Pain (1978) and, most recently, The Prisonand the Factory by Dario Melossi and Massimo Pavarini
which, though published in Italian in 1977, first appeared in English
translation only in 1981.
Of the three studies, the most ambitious and in many ways the
most successful is The Prison and the Factor. The book is comprised of
two essays of roughly equal length, one devoted to European prisons (by
Melossi) and the other to American prisons (by Pavarini). It is therefore
the only study of the three to trace the development of the penitentiary
throughout the whole Western world. It is also the only one in which
the analysis of the prison institution is deeply rooted in the material
conditions, and not only the ideas, of the periods discussed (early sixteenth to middle nineteenth century Europe; late seventeenth to middle
nineteenth century America). This no doubt is because this study is,
finally, the only one of the three studies theoretically informed by Marxism. In fact, The Prison and the Factory benefits immeasurably from the
scientific rigor imposed by the precise concerns of the materialist conception of history in this context which, as the authors put it, are to
"establish this connection between the rise of the capitalist mode of production and the origins of the modem prison." (p. 1.)
As it turns out, the authors establish many connections between the
history of the prison and that of capitalism. Or perhaps it is a single
multifaceted connection. Whatever the proper characterization, the
richness of the authors' metholodogy and the many possibilities open
within it are evident throughout the study. The very pronounced difference in approach (naturally with many similarities) between the two
essays themselves readily displays this richness. Melossi's is more "materialist," tying the birth of the prison system in Europe and developments
within it firmly to the varying needs of developing capital in its struggle
with a working class strengthened or weakened by its changing market
position. In this way the forced productive labour of the Bridewells and
the Rasp-hui, a product of nascent capital under mercantilist protection
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in a situation of scarce labour gradually gives way to the terroristic unproductive labour of the English prisons of the nineteenth century,
when, economically speaking, capital is able to "stand on its own feet"
and control wages by means of a large "reserve army" of unemployed.
Pavarini, on the other hand, tends to stress the formal/ideological
relationships in his treatment of America. For example, one of the most
striking sections of the book is the concluding section of Pavarini's essay
in which he argues that "[t]he central contradiction of the bourgeois
universe is reflected in the microcosm of prison." (p. 186.) This is the
contradiction between the legal equality and autonomy of the worker in
the marketplace ("the sphere of circulation") and his or her complete
subordination in the factory ("the sphere of production")-between
"contractual reason" and "disciplinary necessity." In the prison it appears as the transformation of the legally equal and autonomous (responsible) accused/convicted 6riminal punished according to codified
retributive principles into the really and totally dominated prisoner subject to the arbitrary power authorized by the principle of reformation.
One does not want to overstate the differences in approach between
the two authors for they are matters of emphasis only. They may even
be explained by the real differences in the periods and places studied,
though this seems doubtful. Anyway, each author is sensitive to both
material and ideological concerns. For example, Melossi has very important things to say about the ideological connections between religious reform and the early forms of penal confinement. Pavarini, on the
other hand, explains the initial choice of the unproductive Philadelphia
(solitary) system over the productive Auburn (silent) system on the basis
of more profitable investment opportunities for capital on the open
market.
Furthermore, the authors agree that at the core of the penitentiary
system, unifying its history throughout the many changes it undergoes
and so unifying the book, is the problem of the creation and reproduction of the proletariat in the social if not the physical sense. According
to Melossi "[t]he whole secret of the workhouse and the Rasp-huis lay,
right from the very start, in the way they applied bourgeois ideals of life
and society to the preparation of people, particularly poor people,
proletarians, so that they would accept an order and discipline which
would render them docile instruments of exploitation." (p. 28-29.) It is
one of a set of institutions ("from the family to the school, from the
hospital to the prison, and so on") which "organizes. .. that part of
capital from which it is possible to extract surplus value." (p. 46.) In
Pavarini's words, the penitentiary "is like a factory producing proletarians." (p. 145.) Of course, in Melossi's more materialist view, this role of
the prison is an active one, positively aiding the accumulation process,
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while for Pavarini it is a passive role, reflecting changes in the mode of
production which lead to new conceptions of the "ideal worker." But
the single theme of the making and re-making of the proletariat seems
the most promising and powerful yet offered with which to link the
prison's past to its present. The differences in approach between the two
essays indicate that more theoretical work remains to be done. But they
also indicate the line along which it is to be done and they considerably
sharpen one's perception of this central issue.
In addition to the two main essays, there is also an Introduction
which briefly (and really only suggestively) ties the period under study
with the present and the more remote past, and an Appendix which is
mostly an extended ard very telling materialist critique of Foucault.
The book as a whole is prodigiously researched, drawing on the scholarship of several languages and cultural traditions. The translation is,
with minor infelicities, successful on the whole in bringing out the admirable literary qualities of the original. The Prison and the Factor, is already something of a classic in Europe. Its authors are two of Italy's
leading penal theorists and their work deserves great attention on this
continent. The translation of this book is therefore a major event for
students of social control working in the English language.
MICHAEL MANDEL
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR
OSGOODE HALL LAW SCHOOL
YORK UNIVERSITY

THE EVOLUTION OF CRIMINOLOGY.

By William V Pe#fqr.

Cincinnati,

Ohio: Anderson Publishing Co., 1980. Pp. 1, 98. $8.95.
This short work, which comprises three chapters, is an attempt to
relate the history of ideas about criminality. Unfortunately, the piece is,
for the most part, incomplete, uncritical, unoriginal, and referenced
poorly.
In the opening statements of the book, the author asserts that
"[c]riminologists. . . are specifically concerned with the possibilities for
true justice within the prevailing social order that defines society." (p.
1.) This assertion not only is inconsistent with later statements about
the enterprise of criminology,1 but it places the criminologist in a value1 On pages 13-14, Pelfrey implies that the purpose of criminology is ". . . to effectively
deal [sic] with the problem of crime." On page 51, he asserts that "[c]riminology as a discipline is concerned with the development of a body of knowledge regarding the making of
laws, the breaking of laws, and society's reaction to the breaking of laws."
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laden position rather than one which strives for ethical neutrality. The
first chapter, "The Progression of Criminological Thought," is primarily
a compilation of secondary source citation rather than original text; it
summarizes briefly the classical and positive schools in criminology and
the functionalism and conflict paradigms. Chapter One also contains a
section on the "sociology of criminology." This subheading seems to be
misleading, for Pelfrey discusses here the cognitive substance of the discipline (i.e., "testing and analyzing of concepts," p. 14) rather than a
sociological analysis of criminologists and their ideas.
Chapter Two, entitled "Early Criminological Theories," includes
orientations rooted in biology, psychology, and sociology. As in Chapter
One, much is borrowed directly from Vold. 2 With this reliance on Vold,
the reader sometimes has difficulty ascertaining ekactly the point where
Vold ends and Pelfrey begins.3 Essentially, Chapter Two comprises
brief and uncritical summaries of various theories, including those of
Merton, Cohen, Miller, Sykes and Matsa, Sutherland, Tannenbaum,
Blumer, Hirschi, and Reckless.
The first two chapters are incomplete. The first fails to mention the
neoclassicial school in criminology, however, the M'Naghten Rule and
Isaac Ray (both associated with neoclassicism) are mentioned in support
of William Healy under the subsection "Psychological Theories" in
Chapter Two. Several biologically-based criminological notions are not
mentioned in Chapter Two, most notably the ideas of Dugdale; Goddard; Lange; Rosanoff, Handy, and Rosanoff; and Schlapp and Smith.
Sellin is not mentioned in the discussions of conflict theorists in Chapters
One or Three. Where Sellin is mentioned, under Chapter Two's "Cultural Deviance Theories," no distinction is made about Sellin's primary
and secondary conflicts among norms.
Chapter Three, "The New Criminology: A Review of the Literature," is, perhaps, the only redeeming feature of the book. This chapter
constitutes one half of the total text and is comparatively more extensive
and a bit more critical than the two previous chapters. The new criminology is divided into three branches: Conflict (Vold; Turk; Chambliss
and Seidman; Chambliss); Critical (Quinney; Taylor, Walton, and
Young); and Radical (Platt; the Schwendingers). However, there is no
2

G.

VOLD, THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY

(1958).

3 Note in the following passages about Goring the similarities between Vold's and Pel-

frey's discussions: "The convicts studied were all recidivists. . . , and there were comparisons with university undergraduates (Oxford and Cambridge), hospital patients, and with the
officers and men of units in the British Army, notably the Royal Engineers." Id at 53. "Goring intended to test this proposition by comparing criminals--all recidivists--to a group of
noncriminals-university students of Oxford and Cambridge, hospital patients, and the officers and men of the Royal Engineers of the British Army." W. PELFREY, THE EvOLUTION
OF CRIMINOLOGY (1980).
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mention of the recent biologically-based and communo-anarchisticallybased writings as constituting new criminologies. Chapter Three's subsection, "Criticisms of the New Criminology" is unoriginal, but informative. It is unfortunate that the two earlier chapters do not contain
similar critical comments.
The referencing throughout the book is rather sloppy, for there are
at least thirty-one citations to at least sixteen works which do not appear
in the references. The only table in the book (p. 33) is out of place and
untitled.
In sum, this book lacks depth and originality. Other books currently in print which relate more extensively and critically the history of
criminological ideas4 shbuld be strongly considered before Pelfrey's The
Evolution of Criminology.
GARY S. GREEN
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
THE UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING

JUSTICE AND CONSEQUENCES.

By John P. Conrad. Lexington, Mass.:

D.C. Heath and Company, 1981. Pp. xv, 175. $17.95.
The aims ofJustice and Consequences are far more modest than the
rather grand title implies. Its concerns are limited to a critique of the
rehabilitative ideal and to a series of proposed reforms in the criminal
justice system. The principal purpose of the prison should be the humane incarceration of offenders, not rehabilitation. Major reforms are
needed in order to overcome the sordid living conditions, dehumanization, and jungle atmosphere so characteristic of America's prisons. Pervasive idleness, internal lawlessness, omnipresent fear of fellow inmates,
ineffective grievance mechanisms, gang warfare, and other disgraces
have rendered prison life nasty and brutish indeed. Since much of the
book is devoted to these serious problems and their rectification, Conrad's claim that the "damage wrought by prisons on prisoners is probably overestimated" (p. 68) is not only startling but undermined by his
own descriptive evidence.
Genuine rehabilitation of prisoners has been rare, as indicated by
recidivism rates. Rehabilitative policy has, however, been successful in
fostering the manipulation of inmates. Given that rehabilitation is an unrealizable if not counterproductive ideal, the prison should be concerned
primarily with the retribution of offenders through incarceration. The
4 See, e.g.,

G.

VOLD, THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY

CRIMINOLOGICAL ENTERPRISE

(1979).

(2d ed. 1979); D.

GIBBONS, THE
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prison should not be organized in terms of long-term objectives, Conrad
contends, but should perform its custodial duties as competently and
lawfully as possible. Insofar as some prisoners do improve in the course
of incarceration, all the better. But rehabilitation should remain a "subsidiary" and "incidental" dimension of the correctional enterprise. Vocational training, educational programs, and psychotherapy should be
available to all inmates, but not part of a mandatory program. These
opportunities will equip those serious about survival in the outside
world with the skills for reintegration.
Above all, justice and order must be restored to the prison. Gangs
must be eliminated, surveillance and control must be enhanced, the size
of a prison population should not exceed 400, inmates should work
eight-hour shifts for wages commensurate with those on the outside, the
rule of law must be institutionalized, grievances should be independently reviewed, and "interaction" between guards and inmates, including "personal understanding" of the latter, should be nourished. That
some of these suggestions may conflict with others-e.g., the rule of law
versus increased official control, or intensified surveillance versus personal understanding-is left unconsidered by the author.
Conrad's boldness in rejecting the rehabilitative ideal and embracing incapacitation and retribution is reminiscent of James Q. Wilson's
proposals. The difference is that Conrad does not expect incapacitation
to decrease the crime rate. Indeed, Conrad dismisses the possibility that
any branch of the criminal justice system can significantly reduce crime.
Secondly, Conrad demonstrates greater sensitivity than Wilson to the
root causes of crime. Crime is largely the result of "contradictions inherent in a capitalist society" (p. 9). Chronic unemployment, poverty, a
general lack of opportunity, and other "social injustices" will continue
to aggravate the crime problem irrespective of the efforts of the criminal
justice apparatus. To remedy these problems, it is necessary that
"choice" be maximized. Citizens as well as inmates deserve to be given
alternatives to lives of crime and recidivism. Responsibility for the necessary social changes resides with social institutions other than the criminal justice system.
The existence of criminogenic social conditions does not excuse
criminal behavior or invalidate the correctional enterprise. While capitalism engenders contradictions that propel people towards criminality,
the commission of a criminal act is the result of individual volition, and
the malefactor should suffer accordingly. The link here between societal
causes and individual action remains obscure. If the "choice" of lawabiding avenues is so limited for the poor and unemployed in a capitalist society, by what logic are they to be held culpable and punished for
crimes committed out of apparent necessity? To be sure, this book is not
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greatly concerned with the causes of crime. But to assert that many
criminals are victims as much as victimizers, without considering the
implications for the administration of "just deserts" to such malefactors,
is to sidestep a crucial problem. Moreover, if it is capitalism itself that is
to be indicted as criminogenic, it is curious that Conrad ignores the contributions to this issue in the literature of radical and Marxist
criminology.
Juitice and Consequences does not advance novel arguments. It is a
collection of previously published articles and, as such, suffers from unnecessary repetition and unevenness. The numerous anecdotes that
Conrad indulges in do little to enhance the major points. Despite these
drawbacks, Conrad's suggestions for the regeneration of America's prisons are offered with vigor and insight. They deserve to be taken
seriously.
RONALD WEITZER
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

By Scott Christianson,
editor. Albany, New York: The Center on Minorities and Criminal
Justice, School of Criminal Justice, State University of New York at
Albany, 1981. Pp. xxxv, 247. $85.00.

INDEX TO MINORITIES AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE.

Annotated bibliographical indices on race and crime are readily
available from various sources, e.g., the U.S. Department ofJustice, National Criminal Justice Reference Service. However, Scott Christianson's Index to Minoritiesand Crz'ninalJusticeoffers the most comprehensive,
current, annotated cross referenced compilation of bibliographic information readily available (in one source) to the serious student of minorities and crime.
Similar to most annotated bibliographies, Index to Minorities and
Crinaljusticeoffers the standard "Author Index With Abstracts," complete with full citation. However, unlike most annotated bibliographies,
the Christianson Index also provides a comprehensive "Table of Content" listing that enables the reader to locate: (1) a list of periodicals
indexed; (2) a book publishers index; (3) a comprehensive key to abbreviations; (4) a guide to the use of the subject index; (5) a subject index;
(6) guidance on the use of the author index with abstracts; (7) an author index with abstracts; (8) guidance on the use of the index to judicial cases; (9) an index to judicial cases involving American minorities;
(10) information about the publisher of the index, i.e., in this case, the
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Center on Minorities and Criminal Justice; and (11) an announcement
of financial aid for minorities available from the publisher of the index,
i.e., Center on Minorities and Criminal Justice, Graduate School of
Criminal Justice, State University of New York at Albany.
In brief, Index to Minoritiesand CriminalJustice is an extremely valuable resource for any one compiling information on the interface of racial
and ethnic minorities and crime. While not limited to the indexing of
published material on Blacks and crime, it is especially valuable in noting that social dynamic. It does however, provide a rather comprehensive listing of published materials on Hispanics, Indians and crime. If
this Index has a shortcoming, that shortcoming lies in the limited citations concerned with Oriental and White ethnic minorities and crime.
It is hoped that this Index will be an ongoing reality, and that subsequent editions will address this shortcoming. An index such as this
Christianson Index is especially important when one notes the budgetary
crisis currently affecting most federal agencies; a reality that is likely to
assure the demise of the U.S. Department of Justice, National Criminal
Justice Reference Service.
In closing, it should be noted that this Index is easy to read and to
use. It is especially useful in compiling suggested and required readings
for course syllabi and chapter assignments. This author has also used it
to locate that article whose author or title somehow managed to elude
his memory.
DANIEL

E.

GEORGES-ABEYIE,

PH.D.

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF CRIME,
DELINQUENCY AND CORRECTIONS
SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY AT CARBONDALE

TOWARD

A JUST

By Joseph E. Hick and Peter
Jossey-Bass Inc., 1980. Pp. xix, 202.

CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM.

L. Scharf. San Francisco:
$14.95.*

The criminal defense attorney's role is generally concluded upon
the acquittal, or sentencing, of the client. For those individuals who are
incarcerated, the influence of the bar seldom extends beyond occasional
Legal Aid representation in habeas corpus petitions.' Hickey and
* This review will also appear in the Winter 1982 issue of the CRIM. JUST. Q.
1 Chief Justice Burger has stated, "After society has spent years and often a modest for-

tune to put just one person behind bars, we become bored. The media loses interest, and the
individual is forgotten. Our humanitarian concern evaporates." Address by Chief Justice
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Scharf, on the other hand, are members of that rather curious and insular group which is intimately involved in the theories and practices of
prison reform, i.e., they remain interested in the individual after he is
incarcerated.
Prison reformers labor under the unfortunate handicap of having
to justify their work as they pursue it. The approach to prison reform
which is typically embraced by the public is that judges are too lenient,
there are too many "country-club" prisons, and the problem of prison
overcrowding should be cured (if at all 2) by increased construction. Almost defiantly, Hickey and Scharf decline to engage in an extended justification of their role. In their preface, they state that "In a democratic
society, the very idea of prison is a paradox-or rather a series of paradoxes" (p. ix). Their inquiry begins with a re-examination of the moral
validity of the prison itself. Perhaps, their most daring statement is that
the justification for prison reform has little to do with lowered
recidivism:
Rather, we feel the reason to reform prisons stems from a commitment to
social justice. That is, a just society should seek to guarantee social rights
for all its people, and inmates simply should not be subjected to the degradations, cruelty, hopelessness, and despair that most experience in American prisons today. The right to democratic participation in prison is more
than a psychological or educational technique; it is a fundamental political
right. Further, we insist that, far from being soft-headed and romantic, the
extension of rights to prisoners is the only way to ensure justice to all citizens, particularly the victims of crime (p. xi).
From this point the authors launch into a brief historical analysis of
attempts at prison reform, followed by an elucidation of their "Just
Community" method of introducing democratic principles to prison life.
To those who are experienced in the fields of moral development, penology, and developmental psychology, this arrangement is no doubt satisfactory. However, to attorneys, and others, who may not have looked
beyond the process whereby people are sentenced to prison, and, even
more to those who hear something odd and discordant in the phrase
"prisoner's rights," it would be well to dwell for a moment on the authors' startling premises.
One may begin to come to grips with the notion that inmates are
subjected to "degradation, cruelty, hopelessness and despair" by contemplating the fundamental loss of liberty which results from a prison
Warren E. Burger, Annual Report to the A.B.A., 8 (Feb. 8, 1981). See also infra note 10. I
found it interesting to hear this same concern stated by an inmate at the Federal Correctional

Institute at Danbury. This inmate drew an analogy between the legal and medical professions, noting the extended post-operative monitoring carried on by physicians.
2 See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 101 S. Ct. 2392, 2400 (1981) ("the Constitution does not
mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons. . . , cannot be free of discomfort').
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sentence. I am considering here, not the dramatic, obvious restrictions
which are imposed on a prisoner, but rather the simple, prosaic losses:
the ability to move from one room to another, at will; the freedom to
pass an evening with friends. The loss of liberty is the loss of one's time;
it is the loss of a part of one's life.
Outside that gate is the world of light and freedom, where men live like the
rest of mankind. But those living on this side of the fence picture that
world as some unattainable fairyland. Here there is a world apart, unlike
everything else, with laws of its own, its own dress, its own manners and
is the house of the living dead-life as nowhere else and
customs, and here
3
a people apart.
This notion cannot be lightly abandoned. Even a visitor to a prison
cannot fail to sense the poignance of this loss when the electrically operated doors slide shut and lock in place. But like the child who covers his
eyes to "experience" blindness, a visitor can never fully grasp what is
lost to a prisoner.
It is from this perspective that the reader should consider Hickey
and Scharf's inquiry into the serious deprivations which are imposed
upon inmates. The basic philosophical premise in this book, somewhat
oversimplified, is that all human beings deserve respect; that one sentenced to prison does not cease to be a human being. The basic psychological theory, again simply stated, is that through Hickey and Scharf's
proposed "Just Community," prisoners may achieve some measure of
moral development. This development, they posit, results from prisoners affecting their own lives by participating in certain democratic
4
processes.
The authors examine some early attempts at prison reform and
note some of the factors which led to their ultimate failure. Among the
microcosmic points of stress caused by prison reform was the loss of some
control which was experienced by prison administrators. In addition,
prison reform usually resulted in some loss of power to correctional officers. Naturally, neither group was well-disposed to accept such restructuring. A large and equally serious obstacle to reform was the lack
of political support for reform. Prisoners never constituted a constituency, and the public invariably saw attempts at prison reform as a "coddling" of criminals. None of these obstacles has been completely
3 F. DosToYEvsKY, THE HOUSE OF THE DEAD 6 (1919). The United States Supreme
Court, as well, has recognized the depth of the loss which accompanies incarceration, calling
it an "infamous punishment." Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960).
4 Chief Justice Burger evinced similar concerns when he said that prison structures
"should be aimed at developing respect for self, respect for others, accountability for conduct,
and appreciation of the value of work, of thrift, and of family." Address by Chief Justice

Warren E. Burger, supra note 1, at 8.
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removed to date, but a new perspective, which may be useful in overcoming them, will be discussed in the subsequent text.
Hickey and Scharf experimented with what they called the "Just
Community" in an effort to reform "the basic structure and conception
of prison" (p. 63). Through this device they hoped to bring prisoners to
the stage of making moral decisions for themselves by causing them to
assume responsibility for their actions; by making prisoners aware of the
notion of social interdependence. The vehicle for this effort, the "Just
Community," consisted of exercises in democratic processes.
I
The Just Community experiment began at the Niantic Correctional Center for Women. The authors first held workshops in moral
development theory which were attended by interested staff of the
prison. This staff, in a "model cottage," then began to operate semiautonomously. This arrangement permitted the staff to engage in negotiations with the prisoners who were involved in the project. With this
device, the authors demonstrated respect for the need of the staff to remain involved in whatever changes were to take place. Thus, they
avoided the historical error of diminishing the power of the staff as a
consequence of implementing reform.
Volunteer inmates appeared at the first meeting, where the authors
established themselves as independent mediators. Suggestions were submitted by both sides which were then negotiated by the two groups into
proposals. These proposals were then submitted to the prison superintendent. Group meetings and discussions, regarding daily interaction at
the cottage, continued along these lines. The goal behind these procedures was "that both staff and inmates would increasingly judge their
actions in relation to the moral consensus of the cottage community" (p.
18).
It must already be apparent that the Just Community was a delicate structure, highly dependent on the good-faith efforts of all concerned. Evidence of this delicacy can be seen in problems which arose
when the authors later attempted to adapt the experiment to a halfway
house and, later, to a men's correctional setting. The fact that the program could not be readily applied to varied correctional institutions
may be an indice of imperfection in its structure.5 In this context, I note
5 On the other hand, the variables inherent in what the authors are trying to accomplish
may be incalculable, thus rendering this criticism short-sighted and pedantic. Still, if the Just
Community can only succeed at a few types of correctional institutions, and only with the
active participation of these authors, it may be reduced to little more than a sociological
oddity. Clearly, much more experimentation is warranted before any such conclusions could
be drawn.
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the statement by the authors that "the resolution of social conflict in
community meetings made uncommon demands on staff members, requiring at times the skill of counselors and sociologists as well as ethical
philosophers" (p. 116). One may question how many correctional officers are capable of adequately filling such roles. Indeed, how many
professional counselors, sociologists, and ethical philosophers could function effectively, over an extended period of time, in a prison context?
This strikes me as a question which must be addressed continually if the
Just Community is to be workable. Still, the problems of the authors'
model must not be permitted to overshadow the larger purpose of the
Just Community: to encourage a "sense of common ownership of the
group" (p. 110) (emphasis in original). This purpose must be seen as
sufficiently important to justify the extended effort necessary to implement programs like the Just Community.
The importance of the work is revealed, in part, by the chapter
dealing with the results of the experiment. The authors found that there
was development in the levels of moral reasoning among those who had
belonged to the Just Community. Although rehabilitation is not the
cornerstone of the Community, there was, as well, an improved recidivism rate among its members, especially among those at the higher
levels of moral development.
The authors do not contend that their model Community should
become a fixture in prison life. Indeed, they indicate that the old
problems of administrative and staff opposition to reform continue to
hamper programs like the Just Community. Public apathy, or outright
opposition, are also sources of difficulty in accomplishing meaningful
reform. Therefore, the authors call for serious reorganization of the
prison structure before democracy can be truly extended to the prison.
The authors' position rests on their commitment to the ideal, expressed by John Rawls, that "rights granted other citizens at large belong to the inmate unless society can show them to be incompatible with
the welfare of the victim and the common welfare so that any reasonable inmate might agree to their temporary suspension" (p. 169) (emphasis in original). Thus, "rehabilitative consideration must necessarily
be subordinated to a more important consideration: the moral integrity
of the prison per se" (p. 165). There must be an environment which is
'6
perceived by all as "just and fair."
6 This notion, as expressed by the authors and by Rawls, is hardly novel or revolutionary.
Some two hundred years ago, Cesare Beccaria, in his essay Deidiliuie delepene, proposed that
"in order that every punishment may not be an act of violence committed by one man or by
many against a single individual, it ought to be above all things public, speedy, necessary, the
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II
It is my hope that the last point made has been made clearly
enough: the goal of these authors is not rehabilitation, but rather a
wholesale restructuring of the prison system so as to give to society a
dignity which it professes to embrace but which, in fact, it has never
known. An interesting question to be explored is whether this goal can
be achieved pursuant to existing legal theory. The latter inquiry might
be best pursued after a critical examination of the role which prisons are
supposed to play in society.
Little attention need be given to the goal of "restraint." It is apparent that individuals can be kept apart from society by any variety of
walls and fences. The need to restrain some individuals from uninhibited contact with society is not a realistic obstacle to prison reform.
The goal of "deterrence" is more problematic. Few would claim
that the threat of prison presently operates as a functional deterrent to
those who would commit criminal acts. The common argument is that
if prison sentences were longer, and prison life harsher, the goal of deterrence might be achieved. My response to this argument is, that of those
who call for longer and harsher prison terms, few can claim to have any
meaningful knowledge of the state of modern prison life. It seems to me
that the simple philosophy which supports the belief in the deterrent
value of incarceration is that prisons are such undesirable places that no
reasonable person would take actions which would likely lead to his imprisonment. By "reasonable," I mean those people who are conscious of
the consequences of their actions, both as to themselves and as to those
whom they affect. This theory is logically quite sound; very few "reasonable" people commit criminal acts. 7 Those who break the law, however, are not these "reasonable people." They do not engage in an
extended intellectual balancing process before committing a crime. I
leastpossible in the given cimracstances,proportionedto its crime, dictated by the laws." C. PHILLIPSON, THREE CRIMINAL LAW REFORMERS 82 (1923) (emphasis added).

Rawls refined this notion, although not precisely in a criminal justice context, stating:
A practice will strike the parties as fair if none feels that, by participating in it, he, or any
of the others, is taken advantage of, or forced to give in to claims which he does not
regard as legitimate. This implies that each has a conception of legitimate claims which
he thinks it reasonable that others as well as himself should acknowledge. . . . A practice is just . . . when it satisfies the principles which those who participate in it could
propose to one another for mutual acceptance under the aforementioned circumstances.
Rawls,Justice as Fairness, 54 J. OF PHIL. 653, 657 (1957).
7 The word "reasonable" is being used here to mean, also, those people who have attained a comparatively elevated level of moral development. See Kohlberg, Introduction to
Moral Education, in READINGS IN MORAL EDUCATION (P. Sharf ed. 1978). See generaly S.
HAMPSHIRE, SPINOZA (1951). A Spinozist may argue that "we adjust our moral attitudes
haphazardly, regarding people as free agents whenever we happen to be ignorant of the
causes of their actions." Id. at 158.
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submit that most criminals are not deterred by the threat of prison because of their simple faith that they will not be arrested, or if arrested
that they will not be incarcerated.
The goal of "rehabilitation" is not truly at issue here. The authors
have not made their proposals from the perspective of those seeking a
reduced recidivism rate," although there is evidence that their Just Community did result in some success in this area. Consequently, it is not
truly appropriate to inquire into the rehabilitative effect of extending
democratic principles to prison life.
The darkest goal of a prison structure, "retribution," is the most
difficult to bring into focus. Hickey and Scharf claim that prisons are
presently arranged so as to manifest daily society's condemnation; to
recast the lawbreaker's identity into that of a lower being. Society's
"right to punish" has been long debated, 9 but seldom in the light which
may be appropriate: retribution satisfies a psychological need.
Sigmund Freud stated that it is clear that
the violation of certain taboo prohibitions constitutes a social danger
which must be punished or atoned for by all the members of the community if they are not all to suffer injury. .

.

. If we replace the unconscious

desires by conscious impulses we shall see that the danger is a real one. It
lies in the risk of imitation, which would quickly lead to the dissolution of
8 The ongoing difficulty of effecting rehabilitation in a prison setting was well-illustrated
by Dostoyevsky:
[C]rime cannot be interpreted from preconceived conventional points of view, and the
philosophy of it is a little more difficult than is supposed. Of course, prisons and penal
servitude do not reform the criminal; they only punish him and protect society from
further attacks on its security. . . . [I] am firmly convinced that the belauded system of
solitary confinement attains onlyfalse, deceptive, external results. . . . Of course, the criminal who revolts against society hates it, and almost always considers himself in the right
and society in the wrong. Moreover, he has already endured punishment at its hands,
and for that reason almost considers himself purged and quits with society.
F. DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 3, at 13-14 (emphasis added). The emphasized portion of the
foregoing proposition may be illustrated by an ongoing situation at a Connecticut State
prison. When asked why the chapels at the prison had such extensive seating, the correctional
officer indicated that attendance at services was very high. When pressed on this point, he
acknowledged that many of the prisoners attend, in succession, all of the religious services
held at the prison, with some prisoners attending three or more religious services in a single
day. The reason for this, he acknowledged, was to gain "time out of the cell." Indeed, it
became apparent that many of the rehabilitative programs were attended largely, if not
solely, because attendance constituted "time out." One is thus confronted with the bizarre
spectacle of a series of dedicated professionals, conducting well-organized rehabilitative programs, for a body of prisoners who do no more than go through the physical motions of
participation.
9 See, e.g., Berns, Retribution, Morality and Capital Punishment, in THE PENALTY OF DEATH
42 (1980) ("Do we really know more about crime and punishment than did the ancients?");
Black, Caprice and Racism in the Death Penaly, in THE PENALTY OF DEATH 23 (1980) ("We
don't know anything now that Charlemagne or William the Conqueror, mutilators both, did
not know, that tends to establish or disestablish the propriety of blinding as a punishment.
But some widespread revulsion has taken place as to such things.").
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the community. If the violation were not avenged by the other members
aware that they wanted to act the same way as the
they would become
10
transgressor.
Also implicated in this notion is society's fear of those with power over
their lives, and the corresponding need to have available a class of people that is markedly and demonstrably powerless against society. If this
need exists, it is easily satisfied by prisons. The more punitive the
prison, the easier it is to satisfy the need.
Finally, one must confront the argument that the victim is entitled
to be compensated for his loss through the imprisonment of the criminal. This premise is facially responsive to one's sense of justice, but a
closer examination reveals a series of unanswered questions. Does the
victim know what takes place in prison? And is the lot of the victim
improved through the degradation of the prisoner? I do not quarrel
with the notion that a victim is entitled to some form of compensation. I
would, however, argue that the existing prison structure does not accomplish that goal of compensation.
The question which arises is, what cost is society willing to incur in
order to satisfy a psychological need? The monetary expense, alone, is
becoming astronomical. It has been estimated that the total cost involved in the construction of a single cell is approximately seventy thousand dollars. 1 Hickey and Scharf note that varying prison structures
and locations make it impossible to isolate a single figure which would
represent the yearly maintenance cost for a single prisoner, but a safe
estimate is that this expense is also several thousand dollars (p. 174).
Finally, they make reference to the enormous losses in property tax dollars, due to the maintenance of thousands of tax-free acres.
The retention of prisons which do not rehabilitate or deter, but
which serve only to debase human beings and thus, society as a whole,
is, in the words of the authors "an expensive indulgence indeed."'1 2 It is
the latter cost of prisons which is the highest. I have observed an inmate
who was being punished by being placed in "disciplinary segregation"
in a federal prison. The punishment consisted of a thirty-day incarceration in a cell approximately six feet wide and ten feet long. He re10 13 THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 33 (J. Strachy ed.
1955). One may add to this argument the points made by Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring in
Rhodes v. Chapman, 101 S. Ct. at 2404. "Public apathy and the political powerlessness of
Prison inmates are
inmates have contributed to the pervasive neglect of the prisons ....
'voteless, politically unpopular, and socially threatening.' "
11 Lieber, The American Prison; A Tinderbox, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1981, § 6 (Magazine), at
26.
12 Similar sentiments were expressed by Mr. Chief Justice Burger who has said "We must
accept the reality that to confine offenders behind walls without trying to change them is an
Address by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger,
expensive folly with short term benefits.
note 1 supra, at 7.
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mained in the cell for twenty-three and one-half hours out of every
twenty-four. He was being punished for having been in possession of a
small amount of marijuana. 13 Hickey and Scharf contend that prisoners, as human beings, have some right to be heard regarding the conditions of their confinement.
As was demonstrated by their Just
Community structure, they are not advocating a wholesale surrender of
the prisons to the prisoners. They suggest, rather, that through the use
of democratic processes prisoners should have a meaningful voice in the
administrative decisions which affect their lives.
III
An area of inquiry not examined by Hickey and Scharf, and possibly not appropriate to the format they selected, is the means by which
their proposals might be implemented. Even a statutorily-mandated
guarantee of prisoners' rights would face serious obstacles. One is reminded of a passage by Kafka where a subordinate, in praising a former
commandant's organization of a penal colony, stated "we who were his
friends knew even before he died that the organization of the colony was
so perfect that his successor, even with a thousand new schemes in his
head, would find it impossible to alter anything, at least for many years
4
to come."'
Further, even if prison authorities accepted the notion of increased
prisoners' rights, could statutory change find public acceptance? Some
hope for overcoming this equally significant obstacle may be derived
from the events surrounding the Civil Rights Act of 1964.15 Prior to the
Act, the rights of black citizens were restricted for reasons wholly emotional and illogical. The passage of the Act brought about momentous
changes in popular attitudes. I believe it is fair to claim that the Civil
Rights Act has led to a new national sensitivity, and aversion, to racial
prejudice. This experience suggests that society is capable of accepting
statutory changes when those changes correct illogical excesses. John
Rawls has stated that it is an element of justice to provide the greatest
liberty possible under the circumstances. He posits that if a greater liberty is possible, without loss or conflict, then it is irrational to settle on a
lesser liberty. 16 Further, as Cesare Beccaria has noted, advancing civilization brings greater sensitivity.' 7 It is certainly true that punishments
13 It may be noted, parenthetically, that the prison involved, located in Connecticut, is a

"Level Two" prison. Federal prisons are rated on a scale of one through six, with a level one
prison being the most minimal security prison.
14 F. KAFKA, In the Penal Colony, in THE PENAL COLONY 193 (1948).
15 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983-2000g (1980).
16 Rawls, supra note 6, at 653-54.
17 C. PHILLIPSON, THREE CRIMINAL LAw REFORMERS 60-61 (1923). This hopeful state-
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which were acceptable two hundred years ago are viewed as unacceptably barbarous today.' 8 Perhaps, then, society may be capable of accepting the statutory correction of a patent irrationality.
IV
Some mention should be made of the theoretical legal bases by
which Hickey and Scharf's theories could be implemented. It seems
quite safe to say that most courts would soundly reject an assertion that
prisoners have a right to be heard regarding the conditions of their confinement. An examination of recent authority, however, suggests that
the seed for such an argument has already been planted.
The United States Supreme Court has endorsed some powerful
principles regarding the rights of prisoners. In Hutto v.Finneg' 9 the
Court said that the eighth amendment does more than proscribephysically barbarous punishment. "It prohibits penalties that are grossly disproportionate to the offense,. . . as well as those that transgress today's
'broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity
and decency.' "20 In Bell v. Wol&sh, 2 1 the Court noted that prisoners'
rights are not limited to those available under the eighth amendment;
their first and fourteenth amendment rights are not wholly forfeited by
reason of their conviction and confinement.
The significance of these assertions is that they reflect a recognition
of the fact that a prison sentence need only result in confinement. The
senterce is for a period of time; it does not dictate the daily conditions of
confinement. Stated another way, society has not taken it upon itself
institutionally to strip men and women of basic human dignity. Nonetheless, the methods by which the courts have applied these high principles to the reality of prison conditions do not encourage those who
would institute major prison reform.
The courts have routinely deferred to the "expert judgment" of corrections officials for a determination of whether the conditions of prison
ment is mitigated, however, by Beccaria's observation that "a people's customs and laws are
always, in point of merit and propriety, a century behind its actual enlightment." Id. at 57.
18 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. Tit. VII (1808):
[W]hosoever shall commit adultery with a married woman, and be thereof convicted
before the superior court, both of them shall be severely punished, by whipping on the
naked body and stigmatized, or burnt on the forehead with the letter A, on a hot iron;
and each of them shall wear a halter about their necks, on the outside of their garments,
during their abode in this state, so as it may be visible . ...
19 437 U.S. 678 (1978), reh' denied, 439 U.S. 1122 (1979).
20 Id. at 685 (citations omitted). See also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976), reh g
denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977).
21 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979).
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life are "reasonable. '2 2 This approach has given rise to growing opposition by those justices who see serious dangers in such blind faith. 23 The
voice of this opposition was raised the loudest in the recent Supreme
court decision of Rhodes v. Chapman.24 In that case, Justice Brennan, in
concurrence and joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, noted that
"judicial intervention is indispensible if constitutional dictates-not to
mention considerations of basic humanity-are to be observed in the
prison."'25 Justice Brennan's sentiments were echoed by Justice Blackmun in a separate concurring opinion, 26 and also by Justice Marshall, in
27
dissent.
It is well beyond the scope of this book review to construct a legal
theory which would support the prisoner's right to participate in decisions regarding his confinement. However, some attention might be
given to Justice Marshall's dissent in Bell v. Wofish 28 where he argued
that prison restrictions must satisfy a substantial necessity test, rather
than a rational basis test, in order to stand. This argument developed
from his recognition that "the withdrawal of rights is itself 'among the
most basic punishment that society can exact, for such a withdrawal
'2 9
qualifies the subject's citizenship and violates his dignity."
V.

CONCLUSION

Prisons are the worst possible setting for instilling moral values in
people. Obviously, the task would be easier if effected before the individual committed his first crime. Further, early moral education, if it
prevented the crime, would avoid the terrible economic and psychological harm which accrues to victims. Society would not have to expend
badly needed funds in the investigation, prosecution and incarceration
of the offenders. All of this is obvious, however, and fails to confront the
reality that prisons and prisoners do exist. Hickey and Scharf have pro22 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 540 n.23, 545, 547. See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 101 S. Ct.
at 2400, 2401 n.16.
23 E.g., The courts "cannot abdicate their constitutional responsibility to delineate and
protect fundamental liberties." Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974). See also Rhodes v.
Chapman, 101 S. Ct. at 2405 n.7.
24 101 S. Ct. 2392.
25 Id. at 2402-03 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
26 Id. at 2410.
27 Id. at 2413.
28 441 U.S. at 563. It is of at least passing interest to note that, in connection with the
settlement of a recent prison overcrowding case, Judge Jose Cabranes has ordered the posting
of a notice whereby the court will receive prisoner commentary regarding proposals intended
to upgrade the conditions of their confinement. Lareau v. Manson, No. 78-145 (D. Conn.
Aug. 14, 1981). This proposal is less significant than it first appears, however, since the prisoners are being allowed to note objections as class members, not as prisoners per se.
29 441 U.S. at 589 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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posed methods of dealing with prisons and prisoners, methods which do
not do violence to the democratic principles that our society purportedly
embraces. It is to be hoped that the theories are correct, and, if correct,
that they are utilized. Hickey and Scharf may be pointing the way to a
diminution in the rate of crime, but perhaps more importantly, they are
proposing a means by which society may give itself a truer sense of
dignity.
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